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My research examines how active consumption goals, defined as the benefits 
sought by the consumer, influence cognitive processes and decision outcomes. I address 
two common issues pertinent to consumer decisions. Consumers often face choices in 
which information is not readily available—requiring them to retrieve details from 
memory. Furthermore, consumer choices frequently happen following their weighting of 
decision attributes, sometimes leading to negative outcomes and consequences. In two 
essays, I study how the activation of consumption goals can influence the manner in 
which decision-relevant information is encoded into memory, and also influence the 
weighting of decision attributes in subsequent choice, which affects decision outcomes. 
The first essay explores the effects of goal activation and goal framing on 
memory for information in a consumer-decision setting. Findings of two studies reveal 
that successful retrieval of product attribute information depends jointly on the valence of 
information and its instrumentality to active consumption goals. Further, my third study 
shows the effects of valence and relevance on memory are not merely the result of 
additional attention. My fourth study explores how induced elaboration can improve 
memory for less-instrumental attributes. My results highlight the need for marketers to 
understand consumers’ goals, as negative information about those goals may be more 
influential on subsequent choice, while other negative information may be ignored or not 
encoded. 
The second essay examines the consequences when decision makers identify their 
consumption goals before making a choice. Drawing from the principles of context 
 xi
matching and means-end laddering, I argue that asking consumers to explicitly state their 
consumption goals in advance of a decision will lead them to incorporate those goals 
more directly in the ensuing decision process. In a series of experiments, I demonstrate 
the benefits of goal elicitation and trace its operation to the weighting of decision 
attributes rather than effort or expectations. I also show that the benefits of goal 
elicitation attenuate (or reverse) when elicitation is incomplete, and when goals cannot be 










 A common measure of successful decision making is the degree of progress 
toward one or more goals (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). In a broad sense, most people 
consider it important to establish and pursue goals for themselves, and a considerable 
amount of research has been dedicated to behavioral and decision goals. However, 
consumption goals in particular have received less attention in marketing research. For 
the purpose of this proposal, consumption goals refer to the desired benefits or outcomes 
the consumer hopes to fulfill by making a choice (van Osselaer et al., 2005). These goals 
can be activated in a number of ways, both explicitly and implicitly. In the present 
research, I examine scenarios in which the consumer is formally prompted to consider his 
or her goals, as well as cases in which the goals are activated through abstraction – i.e., 
when product attributes lead to the consideration of higher-level benefits or goals. My 
primary focus is how goal activation affects consumer memory, decision quality, and 
satisfaction. 
Effects of Goal Activation on Memory 
 When choosing among products with multiple attributes, it may not always be 
possible to make direct comparisons between product alternatives. In those cases, it is 
important that the consumer be able to retrieve attribute information from memory in 
order to make mental comparisons, and (ultimately) to choose between products. This 
information is more likely to be encoded and retrieved if it can be linked to an existing 
knowledge structure (O'Brien & Myers, 1987). In Chapter 2, I examine consumption 
goals as a type of knowledge structure and theorize that consumer encoding of 
information is jointly influenced by attribute valence and instrumentality to consumption 
goals; specifically, among high-instrumentality attributes, encoding is more likely for 
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negative information. This bias in the encoding of negative, goal-relevant information is 
not driven merely by attention or rehearsal, but rather by compounded elaboration for 
attributes that fail to provide highly-desirable benefits.  
Effects of Goal Activation on Decision Outcomes 
 Even when memory limitations are not a concern, an error in selection can lead to 
negative outcomes such as dissatisfaction, disutility, and poor use of resources (Milkman, 
Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009). As a result, there exists a wide array of suggested methods 
to help consumers make better decisions, falling along a spectrum from the use of “gut 
instinct” to careful, analytical evaluation of alternatives (Hoyer, 1984). In my second 
essay, Chapter 3, I explore changes in consumer satisfaction and objective decision 
quality when consumption goals are explicitly identified in advance through an elicitation 
process. I expect consumption goal elicitation to fundamentally change the weighting of 
decision attributes, often leading to better and more satisfying choices. However, in cases 
where the consumer does a weak or ineffective job of identifying his or her consumption 
goals, or in cases where attributes cannot be effectively weighted to achieve the desired 
goals, I show that the beneficial effects of goal activation attenuate. 
 In the chapters that follow, I explore the impact of goal activation on memory and 
decision outcomes. My theories are supported by a series of studies, and I offer 





INSTRUMENTALITY, VALENCE, AND THE ENCODING OF  





 The vast majority of consumer decisions involve retrieval of information stored in 
memory, and the topic of consumer memory has received considerable research attention 
(Bettman, 1979b; Lynch & Srull, 1982). Imagine a full day spent shopping for an 
automobile. Although a good deal of research can be done online, it is usually necessary 
to actually see the car, test drive it, and make other evaluations “in person.”  Over the 
course of traveling from dealership to dealership and automobile to automobile, many 
different features—good and bad, varying in their importance—will be encountered. 
Later, when the different alternatives are compared from memory, which attributes are 
likely to be remembered – and remembered correctly? Will only good features be 
encoded (for the purpose of choosing the “best” automobile), or are bad attributes also 
likely to be stored in memory (to avoid making a mistake)? Are the most important 
attributes the only ones that will be stored in memory, or might some novel, less-
important features also remain?  
Prior work has produced widespread evidence for two assertions that are 
especially pertinent to my research, namely, that encoding and retrieval of attribute 
information are affected by 1) consumer goals at the time of encoding, and 2) the valence 
of the attribute information itself. However, existing research has tended to consider these 
two factors in isolation. In contrast to such one-factor accounts, my research reveals how 
both factors interact to influence the way that consumers elaborate on attribute 
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information and encode it into memory. In particular, I demonstrate the interactive 
process in which encoding and retrieval of attribute information during a consumer 
decision depend jointly on its valence and instrumentality for achieving consumption 
goals. In what follows, I explore the interaction, examine an alternative explanation, and 




Consumption Goals, Attention, and Elaboration 
My proposed process begins with the assumption that during the course of the 
decision process, a consumer with pre-existing product category knowledge and 
consumption goals is exposed to product attribute information. It is commonly accepted 
that memory formation and retrieval are goal-directed, such that memory is stronger for 
information that passes some standard of goal-relevance (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; 
Biehal & Chakravarti, 1982; Lynch & Srull, 1982). Applying this principle to the context 
of consumer decision processing, I focus on consumption goals (distinct from behavioral 
or decision goals), defined broadly as the benefits that that the consumer seeks to achieve 
through consumption (e.g., van Osselaer et al. (2005)). For example, an automobile 
shopper may have goals related to fuel efficiency, speed, comfort, etc. Consumption 
goals can be acquired through a variety of routes, both internal and external (e.g., active 
deliberation, accumulated experience, recommendations of others, vicarious learning). 
Particularly relevant to my discussion are those attributes which serve as a means to an 
end, or which lead to a clear understanding of the benefits provided; these are known as 
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instrumental attributes (Cohen, 1979; Lefkoff-Hagius & Mason, 1993; Swan & Combs, 
1976). The instrumentality of a given attribute actually depends upon the decision 
maker’s desired benefits. 
Extant theory and findings clearly suggest that product attribute information is 
more likely to be attended to, elaborated on, and encoded into memory when it is more 
instrumental to consumption goals. A long line of research has demonstrated that 
information instrumental to active goals receives greater attention. In some cases, 
instrumental information may be attended to spontaneously, without effort or even 
awareness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2002). In other cases, attention is volitional, such that an individual screens 
the stimuli that they encounter for information that is instrumental to his or her goals. For 
individuals engaged in a decision process, goals guide attention toward features or 
attributes that can help achieve those goals (Allport, 1987; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). As a result, information that is highly instrumental to goals 
receives greater attention, while low-instrumentality information receives proportionally 
less attention.  
Beyond simply attending more to instrumental information, consumers will also 
tend to process this information more thoroughly. Such selective elaboration is consistent 
with the principle that working memory and cognitive resources are limited, so that 
consumers must be discriminating in their use (Miller, 1956; Shugan, 1980; van den 
Broek, 1990). Furthermore, the very concept of instrumentality implies a link between 
means and ends (Young & Feigin, 1975; Zeithaml, 1988). Consumers engaged in a 
decision process must not only interpret instrumental information (“what is it?”), but also 
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assess that information based on its ability to provide desired benefits (“how specifically 
can it help me achieve our goals?”). This elaboration required for such an assessment will 
facilitate deeper encoding into memory (Anderson & Reder, 1979; Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). Finally, information is more efficiently encoded when it can be “attached” to 
existing knowledge structures (Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982). In consumer decision 
settings, consumption goals themselves provide a knowledge structure to which 
instrumental attribute information may be attached via elaboration. Specifically, 
consumption goals may be mentally represented as a series of means-end links between 
information, and “new” knowledge may attach to nodes within the knowledge structure. 
Combining the arguments above, instrumental information is more likely to be encoded 
into memory. 
 
Attribute Valence  
A second well-examined influence on the processing of information in consumer 
decision settings is the affective valence of that information. A wide range of research in 
social and affective cognition indicates that evaluative processing is often relatively 
automatic, such that individuals form spontaneous, “snap” evaluations when exposed to 
new stimuli (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). Applied to the 
earlier example current setting, consumers exposed to a given attribute level for a given 
alternative should be able to process whether that level is “good” or “bad” relative to an 
internal reference or standard, with minimal processing effort (Kardes, 1988; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000). Most consumers would agree that 60mpg is “good” fuel economy, for 
example, while upholstery would be classified as “bad” if it is damaged or dirty. 
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Importantly, however, a wide variety of interdisciplinary evidence suggests that 
negative and positive information are processed in systematically different ways, such 
that relatively more resources are directed towards negative information. Moreover, it is 
commonly observed that negative information tends to be recalled more accurately (and 
confidently) than positive information (Carlston, 1980). In the study of judgment and 
decision making, an overarching and broadly-supported principle is that of generalized 
negativity bias–i.e., the tendency for negative vs. positive information to have 
disproportionate influence (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Fiske, 
1980; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Scholars in the field have studied a wide range of 
antecedents and consequences to this negativity bias, including attention and elaboration. 
In social cognition, substantial empirical evidence supports the principle of “automatic 
vigilance,” which argues that negative or threatening information will be recognized 
more quickly and receive greater attention than positive information, in anticipation or 
prevention of undesirable outcomes (Pratto & John, 1991). In consumer settings, 
negatively-valenced product information is more likely to be noticed and encoded, 
considered more diagnostic for decision making, weighted more heavily during choice, 
and transmitted more often via word-of-mouth  (Basuroy, Chatterjee, & Ravid, 2003; 
Berlyne, 1954; Chen & Lurie, 2013; Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Herr, Kardes, & Kim, 
1991).  
 
Relevance and Valence: A Synergistic Model 
My fundamental assertion is that although instrumentality and valence are 
important factors in determining whether product attribute information will be encoded 
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and remembered by consumers engaged in a decision process, considering 
instrumentality or valence in isolation gives an incomplete picture of the process. 
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of research examining the joint effects of these factors on 
consumer memory. Building on existing theories of top-down processing and attenuation, 
I propose a compounding effect of elaboration in which instrumentality and valence 
jointly influence the encoding of attribute information.  
 My proposed process begins with the assumption that a consumer has at least 
moderate knowledge of the product category and his/her consumption goals pertaining to 
the decision; such knowledge is necessary to make assessments of instrumentality and 
assign affective valence. During the course of the decision process, he/she is successively 
exposed to attribute information for each product alternative. In keeping with the 
arguments above, my model predicts that this information will be evaluated based on its 
instrumentality to consumption goals as well as its valence, but also that the two factors 
will influence elaboration in distinct yet interrelated ways. My first proposal is that the 
instrumentality of information serves as a weighting mechanism that influences 
elaboration directly. Upon exposure to an item of attribute information, consumers assess 
its instrumentality on a continuum (“not at all instrumental to our goals”… “very 
instrumental to our goals”); such assessment occurs with varying degrees of automaticity, 
depending on the consumer’s familiarity with the attribute and the number of goals to 
which it is perceived as instrumental. Greater weight (of processing resources) is 
associated with those attributes perceived to be instrumental in achieving one or more 
consumption goals. The end result is increased elaboration and greater likelihood of 
successful encoding. Continuing with the automobile example, a consumer who has a 
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consumption goal related to saving money on fuel would assign high instrumentality to 
fuel economy, and elaboration and encoding would be very likely for “miles-per-gallon” 
attribute information.  
My second proposal is that for high-instrumentality attribute information, 
elaboration will be magnified when the valence of that information is negative rather than 
positive. I predicate my argument on prior evidence that processing of affectively-
valenced stimuli involves distinct cognitive mechanisms, such that negative stimuli are 
processed in a more systematic and integrated manner. For example, research has shown 
that judgments of disliking involve a more deliberative and controlled thought process 
than judgments of liking (Herr & Page, 2004). Another pertinent line of research has 
demonstrated that top-down (vs. bottom-up) cognitive processes control how attention is 
directed toward negative information (Erber & Tesser, 1992; Erthal et al., 2005; Van 
Dillen & Koole, 2009). I argue that because goal-directed thought is inherently a top-
down process, the increase in elaboration allocated to information that is deemed highly-
instrumental to consumption goals will be magnified when that information is also 
negative. In the extreme, recognition that a piece of information is both highly-
instrumental (“this attribute relates strongly to my consumption goals…”) and highly 
negative (“this product is very bad on this attribute…”) will lead to a strong increase in 
the weight assigned to that information (“this very bad attribute will prevent me from 
achieving my goal…”). The result is substantially greater elaboration and encoding. 
Although instrumentality will also enhance the elaboration of positively-valenced info, 
the increase will be less substantial than that observed for negative valence. 
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On the other hand, it is likely that low-instrumentality attributes will receive little 
to no elaboration, regardless of their valence. Because these attributes are ineffective in 
providing the benefits the consumer seeks, directing cognitive resources toward them 
would be of little value. Memory should thus be worse for attributes that are not 
instrumental to the consumer’s goals (Huffman & Houston, 1993). Additionally, whereas 
elaboration will be compounded for high-instrumentality attributes when they are 
negative, this effect should not persist as instrumentality diminishes. Prior research has 
demonstrated superior memory for negative, threatening faces, but not for faces of non-
threatening people who have merely experienced a negative event (Kinzler & Shutts, 
2008). Further, there is evidence to suggest that people react quickly to dampen and 
minimize their reaction to negative stimuli (Taylor, 1991); this should especially be true 
when the negative stimuli pose no threat to the decision maker or the attainment of 
his/her goals. In effect, negative information that does not directly influence outcomes is 
bad or unpleasant—yet benign; the consumer has no reason to elaborate on the 
unpleasant stimuli, but in fact should be motivated to avoid this information. As a result, 
these attributes will be actively ignored by the decision maker (Tipper, 1985; Tipper, 
Weaver, & Houghton, 1994). Active ignoring involves the intentional, volitional 
redirection of attention and elaboration away from useless information. In the context of 
consumer decisions, once an attribute has been assessed as both negative and not 
instrumental for goal attainment, it should be relegated to the periphery of the consumer’s 
attention (more so than positive, low-instrumentality information), without being encoded 
for subsequent recall. As a result, memory for negative information should be no better 
(or even worse) than positive information when the attribute is less-instrumental to 
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consumption goals. Importantly, I do not claim that low-instrumentality information will 
be not be processed at all. Even those attributes that are ultimately ignored will initially 
receive some level of semantic processing (Tipper & Driver, 1988), so that 
instrumentality and valence can be determined. In fact, even completely non-instrumental 
information may still receive elaboration (e.g., if it is novel, surprising, or extreme); our 
logic here is consistent with Treisman (1964) and similar models of attenuation. 
Memory is a useful and accurate proxy for elaboration during initial exposure 
(e.g., Anderson and Reder (1979)). In the experimental studies that follow, I utilize 
subsequent recall of attribute information to reflect elaboration patterns. Combining the 
preceding ideas, my synergistic model yields the following predictions:  
  
H1a: The beneficial effect of negative valence on memory for 
attribute information will depend upon its 
instrumentality to consumption goals. 
 
H1b: Among high-instrumentality attributes, memory will be 
more accurate for information that is negatively valenced. 
 
H1c: Among low-instrumentality attributes, memory for 
positively-valenced information will be no less accurate 
than memory for negatively-valenced information. 
 
Overview of Studies 
Below, I present four experimental studies investigating these hypotheses. Studies 
1 and 2 examine my primary hypothesis that the memorial advantage of negative over 
positive attributes depends on the instrumentality of information encountered on those 
attributes. Study 3 explores an alternative explanation:  the memory effects are not due to 
elaboration, but the result of differential attention (measured by differences in viewing 
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time for the attributes). Finally, in Study 4 I directly manipulate elaboration—the 
proposed mechanism—to examine changes in the resulting memory patterns. 
 
Study 1:  Memory for Automobile Attributes 
The purpose of Study 1 was to explore whether goal activation and valence 
interact to influence memory for product attributes. In a completely within-subjects 
design, subjects provided their consumption goals for choosing an automobile. 
Afterwards, they were exposed to product attribute information for a set of four options, 
then completed a test assessing their memory for that information. Based on H1a-c, I 
expected not only that memory would be more accurate for negative information, but 




Sixty-one US residents participated on Mechanical Turk in exchange for cash 
payment.  
 
Design and Procedure  
The cover story asked participants to assume that they were interested in 
acquiring an automobile, and told that they would need to choose among various 
alternatives. First, participants examined a pre-determined list of 12 possible goals for 
selecting an automobile as shown in figure 2.1 (e.g., “…is easy to repair and maintain”). 
Participants were told to select from the list those goals that they deemed personally 
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relevant; all participants were required to identify at least one relevant goal, and they 
were allowed to select a maximum of 12 goals.  
 
 
Figure 2.1:  List of Possible Goals for Selecting an Automobile (Study 1) 
 
 
Next, participants viewed information about four different automobiles (A, B, C, 
and D), randomly presented on a separate screen for 45 seconds. An example automobile 
stimulus is shown in figure 2.2. The automobiles were described along 12 attributes, each 
of which was directly related to a goal on the initial list. For example, the attribute 
“maintenance” corresponded with the goal “is easy to repair and maintain.” The attribute 
profiles were adapted from stimuli used previously by Dijksterhuis and colleagues 
(2006). Attributes were listed in random order for each participant (but held consistent 
across automobiles). All attribute information presented was either positive or negative in 
valence (i.e., neutral attribute levels were presented). For each automobile, positive and 
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negative attributes were approximately balanced (5-7 of each). After viewing the 






Figure 2.2:  Example Automobile Stimulus (Study 1) 
 
 
After making their choice, participants completed a multiple-choice memory test 
assessing their recall of the information presented earlier. The test included one question 
for every attribute of every automobile (i.e., 48 questions total). With two exceptions1, all 
questions offered three response options that described each attribute as positive, 
negative, or neutral. An example memory question is shown in figure 2.3. Following the 
memory test, participants were thanked and the study ended. 
                                                 
 
 
1 Questions for two attributes, sunroof and cup holder, offered two response options:  “does have…” or 









Prior to analysis, each of the twelve attributes was coded as high-instrumentality 
or low-instrumentality for each participant, based on whether the goal was selected by the 
participant in the first part of the study. For example, if a participant checked the box next 
to the goal “…is easy to repair and maintain,” then the attribute “maintenance” would be 
coded as high-instrumentality; otherwise, the attribute would be coded as low-
instrumentality. Thus, the design included valence and instrumentality as two crossed, 
within-subjects factors, and each of the 48 items of attribute information could be 
classified into one of four within-subjects cells (positive/high-instrumentality, 
negative/low-instrumentality, etc.) 2. The dependent measure was the percentage of recall 




                                                 
 
 
2 Because participants self-selected their goals, cell sizes for high-instrumentality and low-instrumentality 
were often unbalanced. Study 2 addresses this potential concern. 
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Results 
Participants checked an average of 5.7 goals on the list. The most-commonly-
selected goals included “…will get a lot of miles per gallon” (chosen by 87% of 
participants) and “…is easy to repair and maintain” (chosen by 79%). The least-
commonly-selected goals were “…allows me to enjoy the sunlight when I want” (chosen 
by 13%) and “…has a place I can put my beverage” (chosen by 30%). At the choice 
stage, 72% of participants selected Automobile D; further examination revealed that this 
was the only option offering positive values on attributes relevant to the three most-
selected goals (mileage, maintenance, and handling).  
Analysis of aggregate responses to the memory questions showed that participants 
selected negative, positive, and neutral answers were selected 40% of the time, 36% of 
the time, and 24% of the time, respectively. Memory scores were calculated as the 
percentage of attribute values correctly recalled. Prior to analysis, memory scores were 
adjusted to account for each participant’s tendency to ‘guess’ in a positive or negative 
direction. First, a participant’s guessing tendency was calculated as follows:  tendency to 
guess positive = (total positive responses ÷ 48); tendency to guess negative = (total 
negative responses ÷ 48). Next, the adjustment was performed by subtracting the 
guessing tendency for each valence category from the memory score for each within-
subject cell. For example, the adjusted score for the positive/high-instrumentality cell of a 
specific participant would be calculated as follows:  
adjusted proportion correctpositive/high-instrumentality = 
proportion correctpositive/high-instrumentality – tendency to guess positive. 
Therefore, an adjusted score greater than 0 reflects an accuracy rate above that 
which could be achieved by guessing. The theoretical range for adjusted scores was (-0.5, 
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0.5). Negative scores were converted to 0 prior to arcsin transformation (see below). Raw 




Table 2.1:  Memory Scores (Study 1) 
 
 Raw Score Adjusted Score 
Positive/High-Instrumentality .46 .10 
Negative/High-Instrumentality .56 .20 
Positive/Low-Instrumentality .43 .07 
Negative/ Low-Instrumentality .43 .07 
 
 
In the main analysis, the adjusted percentages were converted via arcsin 
transformation and submitted to repeated-measures ANOVA with valence and 
instrumentality entered as fixed factors. Consistent with prior research, participants 
remembered high-instrumentality information significantly more accurately than low-
instrumentality information (MHigh=.15 MLow=.07, F(1,59)=10.04, p<.01). In addition 
(and also consistent with prior research), results revealed a significant main effect of 
valence: subjects remembered negative information significantly more accurately than 
positive information (MNegative=.13, MPositive=.08, F(1,59)=9.43, p<.01). Most importantly, 
these effects were qualified by a significant instrumentality*valence interaction 
(F(1,59)=7.13, p<.02). Consistent with my framework and supporting H1a-b, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that memory for negative information was superior to that for 
positive information only for high-instrumentality attributes, (MNegHi=.20, MPosHi=.10, 
F(1,59)=13.16, p<.01). For low-instrumentality attributes, no valence effect was observed 





Figure 2.4:  Memory Scores: Adjusted Percent Correct (Study 1) 
 
Discussion 
Results of Study 1 provide support for my conceptual model, in which consumer 
encoding of attribute information depends jointly on its perceived instrumentality to 
active consumption goals and on the valence of that information. Stated in terms of the 
model, study participants elaborated more heavily on negative attribute information, but 
only among high-instrumentality attributes. Memory scores were significantly higher for 
high-instrumentality than low-instrumentality attributes, and within high-instrumentality 
attributes, scores were significantly higher for negative than positive information. There 
was also evidence of active ignoring, as memory for positive and negative information 
was not significantly different among low-instrumentality attributes. 
However, a potential weakness in the design of Study 1 may hinder interpretation 
of these results. As described earlier, high-instrumentality attributes were identified by 
asking participants to select their consumption goals for the decision. There was 
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considerable variation among participants in the number of goals identified (SD=2.46), 
and it is plausible that this self-selection introduced systematic biases. Study 2 was an 
attempt to replicate the effects revealed in Study 1 while also addressing various 
weaknesses and collecting new measures. 
 
 
Study 2:  Indirect Goal Identification 
 
Although the choice context was the same (selecting an automobile), several 
changes and improvements were made to the design of Study 2. The second study 
utilized an indirect measure to identify consumption goals; whereas participants in Study 
1 had selected their consumption goals from a list, participants in Study 2 were asked to 
assign attribute-importance ratings (see below). I deemed this method suitable for a 
number of reasons. First, the act of contemplating each attribute and assigning 
importance requires implicit consideration of why the attribute matters (i.e., goals served 
by that attribute). Methodologically, this approach allows for continuous measurement of 
goals instrumentality than the binary (check vs. not checked) approach used in Study 1. 
As in Study 1, I expected the joint influence of goal-instrumentality and valence on 
memory, whereby a negativity bias was stronger among high-instrumentality attributes 
but absent among low-instrumentality attributes. 
 
Method  
Participants   
One-hundred-fifty-four US residents participated on Mechanical Turk in 
exchange for payment. 
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Design and Procedure   
As before, the cover story asked participants to assume that they were interested 
in acquiring an automobile, and they would soon choose the one they thought was “best”. 
Participants were then presented with a list of 24 different automobile attributes, as 
shown figure 2.5. Participants were asked to rate the personal importance of each 
attribute on a Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all Important…7 = Extremely Important). The 
importance of each attribute relates directly to the consumption goals it can satisfy; for 
example, a participant who rated legroom as very important would likely have the goal 







Figure 2.5:  Attribute-Importance Assessment (Studies 2-4)3 
 
 Next, participants viewed attribute information for four different automobiles on 
different screens, for 45 seconds per automobile. Unlike Study 1, the automobiles were 
assigned fictitious names identical to those used in prior research (Dijksterhuis, et al., 
2006),  
Also unlike Study 1, the attribute profiles were participant-specific. Each 
automobile represented a unique combination of eight attributes, based on the 
participant’s attribute importance ratings from the previous step. The first four attributes 
for each automobile consisted of those rated as the most-instrumental; the last four 
consisted of those rated least-instrumental. Figure 2.6 presents an example profile in 
                                                 
 
 
3 Attributes included: headlight brightness, legroom, transmission, age, resale value, wheel size, handling, 
rear defroster, GPS accuracy, upholstery, alarm system, MPG rating, maintenance, color selection, sound 
system, number of storage compartments, cruise control, number of cup holders, engine size, suspension, 
number of airbags, window tinting, iPod compatibility, and trunk size. 
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which the participant rated maintenance, transmission, handling and engine size as the 
most important, and headlight brightness, iPod compatibility, GPS accuracy, and rear 
defroster as the least important attributes. In another change from the prior study, 
information for each attribute was described directly in terms of valence: “very bad,” 
“bad,” “good,” or “very good.” Valence was balanced so that each automobile included 
four positive attributes (three “good” and one “very good”) and four negative attributes 
(three “bad” and one “very bad”). In addition, valence was balanced with instrumentality 
so that the most-instrumental attributes provided an even mixture of positive and negative 




Figure 2.6:  Example Automobile Stimulus (Study 2) 
 
After each automobile was displayed, the participant was asked to correctly 
identify the name of the automobile he/she had just seen. This measure was included to 
ensure that participants were paying attention to the automobile names. After viewing all 
descriptions, participants were asked to choose the automobile that was “best.” 
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 Participants then completed a multiple-choice memory test similar to that of 
Study 1. The test included one question for every attribute of every automobile (32 
questions total). Each question offered four response options: “very bad,” “bad,” “good,” 
and “very good.” An example question is shown in figure 2.7.  
 
 
Figure 2.7:  Example Memory Question (Studies 2-4) 
 
 After finishing the memory test, participants completed a series of introspection 
questions. First, participants were asked to rate their difficulty in selecting an automobile 
(0=Very Easy…100=Very Difficult). Next, they completed an open-ended essay question 
asking them to describe their decision process. Finally, they estimated the number of 
positive and negative attributes that they had viewed for each automobile. Afterwards, 
participants were thanked and the study ended. 
 
Dependent Measure 
 Prior to analysis, each of the eight attributes presented to each participant was 
coded as high-instrumentality or low-instrumentality, based on the importance they were 
assigned by participants. The four most-important attributes were coded as high-
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instrumentality, and the four least-important were coded as low-instrumentality. Thus, the 
design included valence and instrumentality as two crossed, within-subjects factors, and 
the 32 items of attribute information viewed by each participant could be classified into 
one of four within-subjects cells (positive/high-instrumentality, negative/low-
instrumentality, etc.). As before, the dependent measure was the percentage of recall 




 The attributes assigned greatest average importance were MPG rating (rated 6.21) 
and maintenance (5.88). The attributes assigned lowest average importance were number 
of cup holders (3.09) and iPod compatibility (3.29). Choice shares for the four cars 
ranged from 17.5% to 31.8%. 
 Six participants failed the name-recognition question for the automobiles. 
Because no participant failed more than one name-recognition question, responses from 
all participants were included in the analyses. On average, participants rated the difficulty 
of their choice task as 63.25 (out of 100). Participants remembered seeing an average of 
3.9 positive attributes and 4.1 negative attributes for each automobile.   
 Memory scores were calculated based on valence alone; for example, a response 
of either “very bad” or “bad” was scored as an accurate response when the item was 
negatively valenced. As in Study 1, memory scores were adjusted for guessing 





Table 2.2:  Memory Scores (Study 2) 
 
 Raw Score Adjusted Score 
Positive/High-Instrumentality .63 .14 
Negative/ High-Instrumentality .69 .19 
Positive/Low-Instrumentality .61 .12 
Negative/ Low-Instrumentality .57 .07 
 
 
Given that the design ensured an equal number of items in each cell, the adjusted 
memory scores were not converted via arcsin transformation for Study 2 (or any 
remaining studies). As before, the theoretical range for adjusted scores was (-0.5, 0.5). 
Scores were submitted to a repeated-measure ANOVA. Consistent with prior research 
and Study 1, results revealed a significant main effect of instrumentality: subjects 
remembered high-instrumentality information significantly more accurately than low-
instrumentality information (MHigh=.16, MLow=.09, F(1,153)=25.78, p<.01). However, 
there was no significant main effect of valence (MNegative=.13, MPositive=.13, F(1,153)<.1, 
p>.9). Importantly, however, these effects were qualified by a significant 
valence*instrumentality interaction (F(1,153)=14.74, p<.01). Consistent with my 
framework and supporting H1a-b, pairwise comparisons revealed that among high-
instrumentality attributes, memory for negative information was superior to that for 
positive information (MNegHi=.19, MPosHi=.14, F(1,153)=14.08, p<.01). Among low-
instrumentality attributes, however, the opposite was true (MNegLow=.07, MPosLow=.11, 
F(1,153)=14.1, p<.01), supporting H1c. Results are depicted in figure 2.8. 
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 Results of Study 2 provide additional support for my theoretical model, while 
improving on the design of Study 1. As before, results suggested that encoding and 
retrieval of choice-relevant information depends on both the valence of the information 
and its instrumentality to consumption goals. In accordance with my theory, there appears 
to be a bias toward negative information, but only among high-instrumentality attributes. 
On the other hand, a positivity bias seems to be present among low-instrumentality 
attributes; this could be caused by counter-arguing of negative information. 
My theory suggests that the memory patterns discovered in Studies 1 and 2 were a 
result of differential elaboration due to the valence and instrumentality of attribute 
information. Study 3 tested an alternative explanation based on the attention: the patterns 
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in encoding may not be due to elaboration, but instead may simply be due to longer 
viewing time of highly-instrumental, negative attributes.  
 
 
Study 3:  Attention 
 
It is possible that the encoding effects revealed in Studies 1 and 2 were not the 
result of greater elaboration for negative information, especially among highly-
instrumental attributes. Instead, these memory patterns could simply be the result of 
greater attention (e.g., “a bad engine…interesting”) rather than elaboration (e.g., “the bad 
fuel economy will prevent me from achieving my goal to save money on gas”). In Study 
3, therefore, I measured attribute viewing time, which is a common proxy for attention 
(Celsi & Olson, 1988). As in Studies 1 and 2, the choice context involved selecting an 
automobile based on a sequence of attribute information. However, the presentation of 
attribute profiles was altered from that of the previous studies, and information about 
individual attributes was presented one attribute at a time. Therefore, subjects were 
permitted to view automobile attributes at their own desired pace, and viewing time was 
measured for each attribute. As in the prior studies, I expected a negativity bias to be 
revealed in participants’ memory for high-instrumentality attributes, even after 







Participants   
One-hundred-fifty-US residents participated on Mechanical Turk in exchange for 
payment. 
 
Design and Procedure   
As in prior studies, the cover story asked participants to assume that they were 
interested in acquiring an automobile. After reading the story, participants encountered a 
screen asking them to rate the importance of 24 different automobile attributes on a 
Likert-type scale (1=Not at all Important…7=Extremely Important).  
 Next, participants viewed information about three different automobiles. Each 
attribute was presented on a different screen, and participants were was allowed to 
proceed at their own pace. The time spent by each participant viewing each attribute was 
recorded. Three automobiles from Study 2—Dasuka, Nabusi, and Hatsdun—were used as 
stimuli, and 12 attributes for each automobile were randomly presented. As in Study 2, 
each automobile represented a unique combination of attributes based on the individual 
participant’s attribute-importance ratings from the previous step. Unlike Study 2, three 
levels of instrumentality were presented:  high, medium, and low. (Medium-
instrumentality consisted of the four attributes that the participant ranked in the middle, in 
the initial rating screen). As before, information for each attribute was described directly 
in terms of valence: very bad, bad, good, or very good. Valence was once again balanced 
so that each automobile provided six positive attributes (five “good” and one “very 
good”) and six negative attributes (five “bad” and one “very bad”). Valence was also 
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balanced with importance, so that high-, medium-, and low-importance attributes 
contained an even mixture of positive and negative values. 
As in Study 2, after each automobile was displayed, the participant was asked to 
correctly identify the name of the automobile he/she had just seen. Additionally, 
participants were asked to provide a 1-sentence description of the automobile. After 
viewing all descriptions, participants were asked to choose the automobile that was 
“best.” 
 As before, participants then completed a multiple-choice memory test. The 
memory test included one question for every attribute of every automobile (36 questions 
total). Each question offered four possible responses: very bad, bad, good, and very good.  
 Study 3 included the same introspection questions used in Study 2, administered 
after the memory test. First, participants were asked to rate the difficulty of selecting an 
automobile (0=Very Easy…100=Very Difficult). Next, participants described their 
decision process by completing an open-ended essay question. Then they estimated the 
number of positive and negative attributes that they had viewed for each automobile. 




 As before, the dependent measure was the percentage of recall questions 
answered correctly. Viewing time for each attribute was measured in seconds. The 
attributes assigned the greatest average importance were MPG rating (rated 6.24) and 
maintenance (5.99). Attributes assigned the lowest average importance were window 
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tinting (3.43) and iPod compatibility (3.57). Choice shares for the four cars ranged from 
27.3% to 44.7%. 
 Four participants failed the name-recognition for the automobiles. Because no 
participant failed more than one name-recognition question, responses from all 
participants were included in the analyses. On average, participated the difficulty of the 
choice task as 65.27 (out of 100).Participants remembered seeing an average of 5.7 
positive attributes and 6.3 negative attributes for each automobile.   
 As in Study 2, memory scores were calculated based on valence alone. Memory 
scores were again adjusted for guessing tendencies; raw and adjusted memory scores are 




Table 2.3:  Memory Scores (Study 3) 
 
 Raw Score Adjusted Score 
Positive/High-Instrumentality .63 .15 
Negative/High- Instrumentality .70 .19 
Positive/Medium- Instrumentality .62 .13 
Negative/Medium- Instrumentality .64 .13 
Positive/Low- Instrumentality .57 .08 
Negative/Low- Instrumentality .56 .05 
 
 
In the main analysis, the adjusted memory scores were submitted to a repeated-
measure ANOVA. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, results revealed a significant main 
effect of instrumentality (F(2,148)=22.02, p<.01): subjects remembered high-
instrumentality attributes significantly more accurately than medium-instrumentality 
attributes (MHigh=.17, MMedium=.13, p<.05), and medium-instrumentality attributes 
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significantly more accurately than low-instrumentality attributes (MMedium=.13, MLow=.07, 
p<.01). The main effect of information valence was negligible (MNegative=.12, 
MPositive=.12, F(1,149)<1, p>.99). Importantly, however, these effects were qualified by a 
significant valence*instrumentality interaction (F(2,148)=4.06, p<.02). Consistent with 
my framework and supporting H1a-b, pairwise comparisons revealed a negativity bias 
among high-instrumentality attributes (MNegHi=.19, MPosHi=.15, F(1,149)=7.69, p<.01). 
Among medium-instrumentality attributes, memory was not significantly different for 
positive and negative information (MNegMed=.13, MPosMed=.13, F(1,149)=.39, p>.5). 
Among low-instrumentality attributes, however, memory was significantly better for 
positive than for negative information (MNegLow=.05, MPosLow=.08, F(1,149)=4.72, p=.03), 








 Next, attention was examined as a potential explanation for the pattern of results. 
Viewing time results are shown in table 2.4 and figure 2.10. Analysis of viewing times 
via ANOVA revealed only a main effect of instrumentality, such that participants spent 
significantly more time viewing high-instrumentality attributes than medium- or low-
instrumentality attributes (MHigh=2.86, MMedium=1.77, MLow=1.86, F(2,147)=29.43, 
p<.01). Analyses revealed no significant main effect of valence (F(1,148)=1.71, p>.19), 





Table 2.4:  Viewing Time [Seconds] (Study 3) 
 
 Positive Negative 
High-Instrumentality 2.88 2.83 
Medium-Instrumentality 1.58 1.96 










 The results of Study 3 provide further support for my theory that consumers 
elaborate more on negative information, but only when it is highly-relevant to 
consumption goals. Moreover, results of the viewing-time analyses serve as evidence 
against the alternative explanation that attention—not elaboration—was responsible for 
the pattern of results obtained. Rather, the results provide further evidence that the pattern 
was driven by greater elaboration for negative attributes and their (in)ability to provide 
desired consumption benefits. Study 4 was designed to directly test elaboration as an 
underlying mechanism for the memory patterns observed in the previous studies.     
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Study 4:  Induced Elaboration  
As in the prior studies, participants rated the importance of various automobile 
attributes and were later given a memory recall test. However, Study 4 included an 
additional, induced-elaboration condition, in which participants were asked to explicitly 
contemplate and describe how each attribute would affect their decision. According to 
my framework, a negativity bias exists in encoding of high-instrumentality attributes, 
because the consumer will mentally elaborate on the “most important” goals that the 
negative attributes cannot achieve. Thus, inducing elaboration should improve memory 
for medium- and low instrumentality attributes; when elaboration is not induced 




Participants   
Two-hundred-thirty-two US residents participated on Mechanical Turk in 
exchange for payment. 
 
Design and Procedure   
The design was similar to that of Study 2, with two major exceptions. First, goal 
instrumentality was manipulated at three levels: high, medium, and low (as in Study 3). 
Second, induced-elaboration was added as a new, between-subjects manipulation. The 
new manipulation occurred after the attribute-weighting task, as participants were 
viewing attribute information for each automobile.  
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 For participants in the control condition, the screen was nearly identical to that in 
Study 2 (except there were 12 attributes, not 8). For participants in the induced-
elaboration condition, a text-entry box was located next to each attribute. Participants 
were told, “Next to each automobile attribute, please type a sentence about how it would 
impact you and your evaluation of the automobile.” 
  
Results 
 The attributes assigned the greatest average importance were MPG rating (rated 
6.31) and maintenance (6.03). Attributes assigned the lowest average importance were 
wheel size (3.78) and number of cup holders (3.57). Choice shares for the four cars 
ranged from 28.9% to 36.2%. 
 Three participants failed the attention-check question for the automobiles. 
Because no participant failed more than one name-recognition question, responses from 
all participants were included in the analyses. On average, participants rated the difficulty 
of the choice task as 68.7 (out of 100). Participants remembered seeing an average of 3.8 
positive attributes and 4.2 negative attributes. 
Using the same method as in Studies 1 and 2, memory scores were calculated 
based on valence alone and were adjusted for guessing tendencies,. Raw and adjusted 






Table 2.5:  Memory Scores (Study 4) 









Positive/High-Instrumentality .65 .14 .66 .17 
Negative/High-Instrumentality .70 .21 .67 .17 
Positive/Medium-Instrumentality .62 .11 .61 .11 
Negative/Medium-Instrumentality .58 .09 .65 .15 
Positive/Low-Instrumentality .59 .08 .62 .12 
Negative/Low-Instrumentality .53 .04 .59 .09 
 
The adjusted percentages were submitted to a repeated-measure ANOVA, and 
Results are depicted in figure 2.11. Analyses revealed a significant three-way 
valence*instrumentality*condition interaction (F(2,229)=5.30, p<.01). Follow-up 
analysis revealed that the valence*instrumentality interaction was significant for the 
control (F(2,125)=8.82, p<.01). For the induced-elaboration condition, however, the 
valence*instrumentality interaction was not significant (F(2,103)=2.15, p>.12). 
Subsequent analysis across conditions revealed the predicted pattern: compared to 
participants in the control condition, participants in the induced-elaboration condition 
exhibited superior recall of both negative, medium-instrumentality attributes 
(MControl=.09, MIndElab=.15, F(1,230)=4.30, p<.04) and negative, low-instrumentality 
attributes (MControl=.04, MIndElab=.09, F(1,230)=4.32, p<.04). Performance did not 
significantly differ across conditions for negative, high-instrumentality attributes 
(MControl=.21, MIndElab=.17, F(1,230)=2.33, p>.12). 
As in prior studies, analyses revealed a significant valence*instrumentality 
interaction (F(2,229)=5.73, p<.01). Consistent with my framework and supporting H1a-b, 
pairwise comparisons revealed that among high-instrumentality attributes, memory for 
negative information was superior to that for positive information (MNegHi=.19, 
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MPosHi=.15, F(1,230)=9.14, p<.01). Memory was not significantly different for positive 
and negative information among medium-instrumentality attributes (MNegMed=.12, 
MPosMed=.11, F(1,230)=.22, p>.6). Among low-instrumentality attributes, however, 
memory for positive information was significantly better than memory for negative 
information (MNegLow=.06, MPosLow=.10, F(1,230)=9.28, p<.01), in support of H1c. Results 
also revealed a significant main effect of instrumentality: subjects remembered high-
instrumentality attributes significantly better than medium-instrumentality attributes, 
high-instrumentality better than low-instrumentality, and medium-instrumentality better 
than low-instrumentality (MHigh=.17, MMedium=.12, MLow=.08, F(2,229)=20.55, p<.01). 
However, there was no significant main effect of valence (MNegative=.12, MPositive=.12, 
F(1,230)<1, p>.99) or condition (MControl=.11, MIndElab=.13, F(1,230)=1.61, p>.2). 
 
  




 The results of Study 4 provide additional support for my framework in which 
encoding of attribute information during a decision task depends upon both the 
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instrumentality of information to consumption goals and its affective valence. Findings in 
the control condition were consistent with the three prior studies: among high-
instrumentality attributes, memory was more accurate for negative than positive 
information, but the opposite was true among low-instrumentality attributes. Moreover, 
the study provided additional evidence that these memory patterns were due to 
differential elaboration. When participants were forced to elaborate on each product 





Supplementing prior work on consumer memory that has examined single 
variables in isolation, my findings suggest that encoding of information during consumer 
decisions depends jointly on the valence of that information and its instrumentality to 
consumption goals. Specifically, the memorial advantage of negative information is 
magnified for attributes that are goal-relevant. This primary finding was replicated across 
four experimental studies. Additionally, the third study helped rule out attention as an 
alternative explanation for the observed effects. Furthermore, findings of my fourth study 







 My findings expand current understanding of the manner in which consumers 
utilize information for the purpose of forming attitudes, making decisions, and achieving 
their consumption goals. In particular, my theory integrates existing work that has 
identified distinct effects of attribute valence and goal instrumentality on memory 
formation and retrieval. Rather than examining valence or instrumentality in isolation, I 
provide a more comprehensive framework in which these factors are interdependent: 
elaboration and encoding of information is enhanced for negatively-valenced attributes, 
primarily when the attribute is also highly instrumental to consumption goals. 
Certain aspects of my framework relate directly to contemporary theories of 
affective processing. In particular, emotional appraisal models argue that prior to forming 
emotional reactions to stimuli, individuals make instantaneous assessments of various 
stimulus properties, including instrumentality and valence (Scherer, 2013). The meaning 
of instrumentality and valence is considered distinctly in appraisal models, such that the 
intrinsic pleasantness of a stimulus determines its valence, and instrumentality concerns 
the ability of the stimulus to satisfy needs or goals. Beyond meaning, my theory 
conceptualizes the effects of instrumentality and valence as interdependent:  negative 
valence compounds the effect of goal-instrumentality on elaboration, encoding and recall.  
  My work also informs broader research on the structure and organization of 
consumer memory. In particular, my findings build on the contemporary view that 
information is stored in memory as a collection of interconnected nodes (Bower, 1981), 
and my results can be interpreted according to the principles of spreading activation and 
knowledge schema (Collins & Loftus, 1975), which. Considered in these terms, 
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consumption goals can be viewed as pre-existing knowledge structures, and encoding of 
attribute information will be facilitated when that information can be readily associated 
with one or more of these pre-existing structures. Thus, greater elaboration activates a 
broader network of schema. My findings demonstrate that elaboration of goal-relevant 
product information is compounded when that information is negative; in terms of the 
network models, this suggests that exposure to negative, goal-relevant product 
information activates an especially large network, broadening the number of potential 
“connection points” to which the new information may be attached. 
In contrast, the concept of “spreading inhibition” has been used to describe 
cognitive processes that prevent unimportant information from triggering additional 
schema in memory (Tipper & Driver, 1988), minimizing distractions and aiding focus. I 
suggest that my findings can be viewed as evidence of spreading inhibition in consumer 
information processing: low-instrumentality information is prevented from triggering 
additional schema, more so for negative than for positive attribute information.  
   
Practical Implications 
My findings offer a number of implications for marketers regarding the 
presentation of product information through advertising, packaging, communications, 
etc., as well as important implications for consumers themselves. A straightforward 
conclusion of my work is that it is critical for marketers to understand the most-important 
consumption goals that customers have in mind as they evaluate alternatives in the 
marketplace. Beyond a general understanding of “what matters” to the consumer, any 
opportunity to stratify or prioritize consumer goals should be seized. Understanding of 
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consumption goals can be enhanced through the application of formal laddering methods 
or a variety of other feedback mechanisms (surveys, etc.). In addition, analysis of 
contemporary WOM forums (social media, reviews, etc.) can be especially useful for 
gleaning “what matters” to customers in the category.  
Beyond simply identifying consumption goals, marketers should aim to actively 
influence which attributes are perceived as goal-relevant. This is especially useful for 
those attributes on which a brand is clearly superior to competitors. Prior work suggests 
that even “trivial” attributes can be important for establishing differentiation (e.g., 
Carpenter et al. (1994). If marketers can make the trivial seem instrumental to an 
important goal, however, this may increase the likelihood that they will be stored in 
memory. 
From a consumer perspective, my research offers important implications for 
enhancing memory-based decision making. For example, it is important to have a 
thorough understanding of one’s own consumption goals at the time of information 
exposure, as doing so will improve encoding and retention of information that is most 
relevant to those goals. Unfortunately, prior work indicates that consumers are 
surprisingly poor at identifying their consumption goals, (Bond, Carlson, & Keeney, 
2008). My findings indicate a steep decline in memory between attributes perceived as 
high- and medium-instrumentality. If a consumer somehow fails to consider medium-
level goals, critical attribute information may be neglected and forgotten. To avoid 
negative repercussions of this failure on subsequent decisions, consumers would be well-
advised to engage in formal or informal elicitation, laddering, or other goal contemplation 




Limitations and Future Research 
 Across my experiments, both the product decision and memory test occurred 
immediately after exposure to product information. Moreover, the environment was 
essentially constant at encoding and retrieval, with consistent wording, presentation of 
attributes, etc. In real-world settings, consumers often gather information days or weeks 
before making their decision, information is acquired in numerous forms (advertisements, 
salespeople, observation, etc.), and the retrieval environment may be very different than 
the encoding environment. Although I expect my basic findings to replicate over longer 
time intervals, future research could test this directly. More generally, it would be 
worthwhile to test my predictions in a more natural setting (e.g., by use of field studies or 
consequential choices). 
All four of my studies involved the same choice context, selecting an automobile. 
This product category offers many methodological advantages: it is realistic, has 
numerous and diverse attributes, is familiar to most consumers, and has been used 
frequently in consumer research. On the other hand, it is plausible that certain properties 
of the category may have influenced or limited my investigation. For example, attribute 
preferences for automobiles are often well-established, making it necessary to measure 
than manipulate goal instrumentality. To overcome this constraint, future research might 
explore my framework using product categories with weaker preferences. More 
generally, the effects shown in my studies may vary with familiarity, due to such factors 
as perceived risk, uncertainty, and search behavior. Prior research has documented an 
inverted-U relationship between product familiarity and recall of attribute information 
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(Johnson & Russo, 1984), such that moderate familiarity is associated with higher recall 
than either high or low familiarity. A similar, inverted-U pattern has been shown for 
information search (Ozanne, Brucks, & Grewal, 1992) and perceptions of decision risk 
(Moreau, Lehmann, & Markman, 2001). Therefore, it would be valuable to extend the 
current investigation to less-familiar products (e.g., emerging technologies). To the extent 
that heightened risk perceptions manifest in larger negativity bias, my theory predicts not 
only greater elaboration of negative information for such products, but greater 
magnification of the effects of goal instrumentality. Each of these variables represents a 
fruitful opportunity for extending the scope and implications of my research.    
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CHAPTER 3 
ELICITATION OF CONSUMPTION GOALS AS AN  





 Consider the example of two consumers, both shopping in a retail environment. 
The product alternatives they evaluate are each described by various attributes. Although 
the two shoppers have similar wants and needs, similar budgets, and similar expertise in 
the category, they pursue the shopping decision using very different methods. The first 
customer has carefully spent a few minutes thinking about the benefits she wants the 
product to provide. The reflection process is not exhaustive: after considering pros and 
cons of the similar products she has owned in the past and getting feedback from friends 
and other sources, she thinks that she has a good idea of what matters to her. The second 
customer, on the other hand, has not thought much about buying the product beforehand, 
other than recognizing that he wants to buy one. He scans over the product attributes, 
some of which catch his attention more than others. Eventually, both customers make 
their choices and head to the cash registers. Which consumer is more likely to be satisfied 
with the product he/she selected? 
 Because the first customer spent time before the decision identifying the benefits 
she wanted the product to provide, we may expect her to make a better decision—and end 
up more satisfied—than the other consumer who proceeded directly to the choice. As I 
will demonstrate below, identifying one’s desired benefits before making a choice is 
often helpful in achieving better decision outcomes. But why does this happen? Is it 
because we have worked harder at making the decision? Does identifying desired benefits 
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change our expectations about the decision, which in turn influences the outcome? 
Furthermore, are there times when considering desired benefits might actually lead to 
worse decision outcomes? 
Given the immediate and downstream costs of suboptimal decisions (outcome and 
process dissatisfaction, misuse of resources, regret, etc.), researchers have sought various 
ways to shift consumers to a more thorough or efficient decision-making process 
(Milkman, et al., 2009). In particular, a broad array of recent work on the topic of “choice 
architecture” highlights the importance of organizing the context in which people make 
decisions (Hughes, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A common theme in this domain is 
the ability of benevolent third parties to improve decision outcomes by implementing 
relatively simple adjustments to the decision environment. My ideas are predicated on the 
principle of choice architecture, but I add a distinct element of consumer self-sufficiency. 
Specifically, I present a robust mechanism which may be used by consumers themselves 
to improve a broad range of decisions: prior elicitation of the benefits sought from 
consumption. (For clarification, I use the term benefits interchangeably with consumption 
goals and objectives to describe desired consequences). I also show cases where 
elicitation fails to help the decision maker, and he/she would actually be better off using 
instinct, heuristics, or some other process to make a choice. 
In the research that follows, I will describe how contemplating desired benefits 
changes the decision-making process itself, leading to better outcomes most of the time. 
My main contribution is the development of a simple, novel, and portable process that 
helps consumers act as their own ‘choice architects.’ I argue that elicitation helps 
consumers to place appropriate and stable weight on decision attributes that ultimately 
 46
matter at the time of consumption, rather than attributes made salient by the immediate 
decision context  (Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1999; Rooderkerk, Van Heerde, & 
Bijmolt, 2011; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). Given the inherent link between goal 
fulfillment—in this case, achieving desired benefits—and subjective outcomes, the net 
result of this restructuring process should be more satisfying choices. To test my 
framework, I present a series of studies measuring the impact of elicitation on process 
and outcome variables within various decision tasks. Additionally, I consider potential 
‘down sides’ of benefit elicitation. Specifically, I present conditions in which the benefit-
elicitationattribute-weighting link is disrupted, having a detrimental effect on decision 
outcomes. I conclude by considering implications for researchers and practitioners.  
            
Theoretical Background 
The consumer choice process is classically defined as “moving from some initial 
state to a desired state” (Bettman, 1979a). What determines the desired state, and how do 
consumers tell where they are on the continuum? Philosophical answers to this question 
vary, but a common measure of successful decision making is the degree of progress 
toward one or more goals (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). For many researchers, the concept of 
choice satisfaction has been closely intertwined with that of perceived goal progress and 
attainment (Oliver, 1980). 
 
Consumption Goals and Means-End Frameworks 
Following the tradition of prior scholarship, I define consumption goals as the 
desired benefits or outcomes a consumer hopes to fulfill by making a choice (Huffman & 
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Houston, 1993; Reynolds & Gutman, 1988; van Osselaer, et al., 2005). Defined this way, 
consumption goals bear both similarities and distinctions with other types of goals 
studied by researchers in related fields. An extensive body of work has been dedicated to 
the study of behavioral goals, by which individuals regulate their behavior consciously 
and non-consciously to achieve desired actions (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, 
& Trotschel, 2001; Custers & Aarts, 2005). In the field of judgment and decision making, 
an influential line of research has evolved around decision goals (e.g., effort 
minimization, accuracy, justification, etc.), and the process by which individuals trade-off 
between these goals in different decision contexts (Luce, 1998; Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1993; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Simonson, 1989; van Osselaer & 
Janiszewski, 2012); within this taxonomy, consumption goals represent a subset of 
accuracy goals, by which consumers seek the normatively-optimal alternative. At a broad 
level, comprehensive frameworks have recently been developed to illustrate how 
momentary goal activation influences choice through the selection of means (behaviors 
or products) that allow individuals to pursue those goals, and how the importance and 
instrumentality of decision attributes are affected by time and situational factors (van 
Osselaer & Janiszewski, 2012). My approach builds on these frameworks by presenting a 
tool by which goal activation is directed by consumers themselves and based on retrieved 
or recognized preferences. The influence of context (e.g., what happens to be noticed or 
cued) should thus be minimized.  
Of the most direct relevance to my work are classical, hierarchical models of 
goal-based consumer decision making and its outcomes (Bagozzi & Dholakia, 1999; 
Gutman, 1982). These approaches present consumers as proceeding through an organized 
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hierarchy of goals, e.g.: focal goals (“What is it that I want?”); subordinate/means goals 
(“How can I get what I want?”); and superordinate goals (“Why do I want it?”). More 
recent research has added greater specificity and refinement to traditional hierarchical 
frameworks; for example, Huffman et al. (2000) offer a hierarchy including “life themes 
and values” and “life projects” to “feature preferences.” One such hierarchical approach, 
the laddering method, is a widely-accepted tool for understanding the means-end links 
that underlie decision outcomes (Gutman, 1982; Reynolds & Gutman, 1988). Although 
approaches to laddering vary, they typically involve: 1) asking consumers to identify the 
features (attributes) of a product that drove a recent purchase decision; and then 2) 
exploring the reasons that those features mattered to the consumer, with questions of 
increasing abstraction. In essence, laddering allows consumers to reconstruct the process 
by which product attributes lead to desirable benefits or consequences, which in turn 
align with ultimate values. For marketers, laddering has proven useful for understanding 
and communicating with target customers; the tool is used extensively in product 
development (Langerak, Peelen, & Nijssen, 1999) and serves as the basis for 
communication models (Reynolds & Whitlark, 1995). 
My approach to improving consumer decisions borrows from laddering and the 
broader notion of means-end hierarchies. However, from a prescriptive standpoint, it is 
impractical to expect autonomous execution of laddering by consumers themselves in 
typical choice settings. For example, what specific questions should these consumers 
contemplate? Concepts such as ‘attributes,’ ‘consequences,’ and ‘values’ are unlikely to 
be defined or applied consistently, and it is often unclear what level of abstraction is 
appropriate (Grunert & Grunert, 1995). More generally, the specific methodologies used 
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can heavily impact the means-end specifications that result. With these concerns in mind, 
I develop below a straightforward and generalizable approach, based on hierarchical 
frameworks, through which consumers may independently and efficiently improve 
decision outcomes. My approach allows consumers to independently travel ‘down’ the 
ladder; that is, desired consequences of consumption are considered first, and decision 
attributes are then evaluated based on their ability to produce these consequences.  
 
Benefit Elicitation 
Formally, I define benefit elicitation as the process by which individual 
consumers explicitly consider and identify the consequences they seek to achieve (Bond, 
et al., 2008). I operationalize elicited benefits as the various ways in which consumers 
complete the following sentence:  “I would like to choose a [product/service] that allows 
me to….” For example, a consumer selecting an automobile may complete the above 
sentence by identifying benefits such as “save money on gasoline;” “keep my passengers 
safe;” or “extend my legs comfortably while driving.”  
I offer a simple, self-guided process for use by individual consumers who will 
select and use products for themselves. My approach can be compared to elicitation in 
decision analysis and related fields, which involves a process of gathering and identifying 
objectives, requirements, or expectations for decision makers and stakeholders (Keeney 
& Raiffa, 1993; Schwarz & Roth-Berghofer, 2003; Sommerville & Sawyer, 1997; 
Svenson, 1996; Van Lamsweerde, 2001). Decision-analytic applications of elicitation 
typically involve a multi-phase, collaborative process engaging multiple parties. Analysts 
conducting elicitation utilize detailed interviews, surveys, simulations, etc., while 
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facilitating the process by incorporating expert advice, optimization techniques, and 
customized solutions (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 1995). Although I build on 
the tenets of this method, my approach is quite distinct from existing work in both 
substance and application. In contrast to complex, multi-stage interventions targeting 
groups with multiple stakeholders, I focus specifically on the viability of benefit 
elicitation as a tool for ordinary consumer decisions.  
I restrict my focus to choice settings in which the consumer has at least moderate 
knowledge and experience with the category under consideration. In these settings, I 
suggest that the elicitation of benefits can be effectively guided by consumers 
themselves, with minimal external assistance. In other words, consumers facing an 
impending decision should be capable of identifying the benefits that they seek to receive 
from consumption. In general, identification of benefits will involve a combination of 
memory retrieval and mental simulation: e.g., consumers may recall past experiences 
with products in the category, making note of benefits that were present or lacking; they 
may consider experiences of acquaintances who have made decisions in the category; or 
they may visualize the consumption experience, imagining favorable and unfavorable 
outcomes. As in decision analysis, therefore, benefit elicitation includes objectives that 
signified successful outcomes in the past (for oneself or others), and additional benefits 
that may be unique to the current decision. Below, I will show how failures in memory 
retrieval and simulation may lead to incomplete goal elicitation and attribute-weighting 






The Impact of Elicitation on Decision Processing 
Effort and Expectations 
Intuitively, the act of eliciting benefits might alter subsequent processing in a 
variety of ways that impact choice quality or satisfaction. One possibility is that engaging 
in benefit elicitation will simply increases motivation and subsequent effort towards the 
decision task. For example, considering desired outcomes of a choice might lead 
consumers to consider the decision seem more personally relevant or important, in turn 
causing them to process choice-relevant information more effortfully (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Payne, et al., 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Given that elaboration tends to 
enhance performance on complex tasks, increased effort provides a reasonable account 
for any observed benefits of elicitation. 
On the other hand, the act of elicitation might lead consumers to alter their 
expectations or standards regarding the outcome of a choice. Among various possible 
scenarios is an upward revision of expectations: that is, after contemplating their desired 
consumption benefits, consumers may expect to actually find a product that will provide 
the majority of those benefits (Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992). Under standard 
satisfaction models (Oliver, 1977), an increase in expectations could lead to higher 
satisfaction or lower satisfaction (assimilation or contrast), depending on the quality of 
options actually provided.  
 
An Attribute-Weighting Account  
The accounts above are viable, and I control for them in the studies below. 
However, my framework presents a very different argument that can be summarized as 
follows: benefit elicitation impacts decision outcomes through the relative importance 
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assigned to attributes at the deliberation stage. This proposal is consistent with broad 
models of goal regulation and pursuit (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Newell & Simon, 1972), 
in which individuals first identify a desired end state, then seek out ways to reach that 
state: attributes that are perceived as useful in reaching the desired end state should be 
assigned greater weight in the decision. In addition, my proposal follows naturally from 
the means-end conceptualizations discussed above. However, in contrast to traditional 
laddering, the ‘starting point’ of benefit elicitation is the desired consequences of a 
selecting a product, rather than specific attributes or attribute levels. I expect this 
difference to have important repercussions for the ensuing decision process: by directing 
consumers to consider desired outcomes first, elicitation encourages them to later 
evaluate attributes based on their value or instrumentality for attaining those outcomes. 
For example, if the desired outcome when selecting a lunch option relates to healthiness, 
fat content (high instrumentality) would receive more weight than cooking time (low 
instrumentality). 
Therefore, goal elicitation provides a direct means of addressing the context 
matching problem pervasive in preference-based decisions (Payne, et al., 1999), in which 
the value of an option may vary according to the decision context itself. The implications 
can be illustrated in terms of traditional models of attitude formation and choice 
(Fishbein, 1963; Shocker & Srinivasan, 1979; Westbrook, 1981). Under these models, 
consumers choosing amongst a set of options will (implicitly or explicitly) identify 
attributes of the options, the importance of each attribute, and the level of each attribute 
provided by each option. However, an immense body of work has documented ways in 
which attribute weighting can be affected by aspects of the decision environment (Dhar, 
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Nowlis, & Sherman, 2000; Payne, et al., 1999; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Suk & Yoon, 
2012). Even seemingly “irrelevant” contextual features (information format, order of 
presentation, ambient factors, etc.) can have dramatic influence on which decision 
attributes are noticed and how they are appraised. A natural consequence is not only 
instability in revealed preferences, but also (and more important for present purposes) 
reduced likelihood of satisfaction if attributes that matter for consumption go unnoticed 
or mis-weighted during choice. For example, a consumer shopping for a laptop may over-
weight the fingerprint reader on a given model, simply because the salesman highlighted 
its uniqueness. The consumer may focus more on salient attributes (those which happen 
to be noticed or remembered) than on relevant attributes (those which can achieve goals) 
(Van Ittersum, Pennings, Wansink, & Van Trijp, 2007). 
For consumers who have undergone elicitation, however, choice processing will 
be directed according to the benefits elicited. An important assumption is that elicitation 
occurs in advance of the decision process, so that consumers are distanced from the 
immediate choice environment and focus instead on ‘things that will mater’ during 
ultimate consumption. If so, the elicitation process enables consumers to effectively align 
the decision context more closely with the consumption context. Rather than focusing 
directly on product attributes themselves, they will consider and weight attributes based 
on their ability to provide desired benefits (Garbarino & Johnson, 2001; van Osselaer, et 
al., 2005). As a result, these consumers who have engaged in benefit elicitation will be 
less susceptible to elements of the decision that are unlikely to affect satisfaction. For 
example, assume that an automobile shopper identifies (in advance) the benefit “saves me 
money on gasoline” as critical and the benefit “allows me to transport a lot of cargo” as 
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moderately important. When exposed to the options available, this consumer will 
incorporate attributes such as ‘gas mileage’ and ‘trunk size’ in her evaluation – and 
assign greater weight to the former – even if the salesman happens to emphasize the 
latter. Stated differently, prior elicitation should lead to a distribution of attribute weights 
that is less context-dependent and more representative of actual consumption, increasing 
the likelihood of a subjectively and objectively ‘better’ choice. 
Specifically, I expect that elicitation will tend to improve decision outcomes, as a 
result of an attribute weighting process that reflects ultimate consumption rather than the 
immediate decision environment. Moreover, this effect of should occur independently 
from any effects of elicitation on effort or expectations regarding the choice. Subject to 
certain moderators, which I will discuss later:  
H1:  Independent of effort or expectations, elicitation of 




Incomplete or Limited Elicitation 
What consequences will obtain when relevant consumption goals are omitted 
during elicitation? Prior evidence indicates that individuals are not always comprehensive 
in identifying their decision objectives (Bond, Carlson, & Keeney, 2010). Furthermore, a 
stream of research in the attitude literature, stemming from the work of Wilson and 
Schooler (Wilson & Schooler, 1991), shows that individuals often lack insight into the 
reasons underlying their own preferences. To the extent that consumers are unable to 
sufficiently introspect about drivers of their ultimate consumption utility, elicitation may 
be hampered or counterproductive. In the extreme, asking consumers to identify desired 
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benefits may even disrupt an otherwise reasonable decision process, producing 
suboptimal choices.  
I expect the goal-driven attribute weighting process to falter when goals relevant 
to consumption are left unconsidered during elicitation. In particular, decision attributes 
that relate to omitted goals will tend to be mis-weighted. More generally, I predict that 
when elicitation is constrained, revealed attribute importance weights will be 
systematically distorted and less reflective of their actual importance at consumption, 
such that decision quality suffers. Stated formally: 
H2a:  The omission of goals during an elicitation task will lead to 
distortion in the revealed importance weights of attributes 
relevant to those goals. 
 





Instrumental and Determinant Attributes 
 Even when the decision maker thoroughly identifies his/her consumption goals, 
elicitation may not lead to desirable outcomes. The attributes used to describe an 
assortment can vary greatly, and these attributes can directly affect the decision maker’s 
ability to infer or predict what consequences or outcomes will follow consumption. In 
some cases, attributes merely provide a description (e.g. color). Other times, attributes 
directly indicate what the product will do for the consumer (e.g. miles per gallon). For 
goal elicitation to be effective, the decision maker must not only thoroughly identify the 
benefits he/she seeks in consumption, but also be able to allocate decision weight 
appropriately to the attributes that will provide the desired benefits. The extent to which 
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the decision involves two particular types of attributes, instrumental and determinant, can 
have a tremendous influence on the weighting process, and therefore the effectiveness of 
goal elicitation. 
Particularly relevant to my discussion are those attributes which serve as a means 
to an end, or which lead to a clear understanding of the benefits provided; these are 
known as instrumental attributes (Cohen, 1979; Lefkoff-Hagius & Mason, 1993; Swan & 
Combs, 1976). The instrumentality of a given attribute actually depends upon the 
decision maker’s desired benefits. For example, color would be instrumental for a 
consumer seeking benefits related to appearance, but not for a consumer with goals 
related to size or weight. 
As described above, I theorize that goal elicitation improves decision outcomes by 
leading the decision maker to appropriately weight product attributes in accordance with 
the benefits he/she seeks. Thus, the effectiveness of elicitation depends upon the decision 
maker’s ability to correctly interpret the instrumentality of attributes. Consumers who 
engage in goal elicitation will have benefits in mind when they evaluate product 
attributes, and they may erroneously infer instrumentality even when none exists (e.g., 
inferring quality from price, even if the two are not correlated). The resultant weighting 
of attributes that have no bearing on the decision outcome may nullify the effect of goal 
elicitation, or worse—lead to suboptimal decisions. 
 In addition to instrumentality, another consideration is whether an attribute is 
regarded as important and differentiates a product alternative by its mere presence; such 
characteristics define a determinant attribute (Alpert, 1971; Arnold, Ma, & Tigert, 1978; 
Myers & Alpert, 1968). When a determinant attribute is present, it often receives a 
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majority of the decision weight. As described above, the choice context itself may lead 
the decision maker to perceive an attribute as determinant; for example, a salesperson, a 
friend’s advice, or signage could highlight the presence of a single attribute, which then 
becomes over-weighted. If the attribute is not actually instrumental in achieving desired 
benefits, decision outcomes will suffer. My argument thus far suggests that goal 
elicitation improves choice outcomes by leading the decision maker to weight an array of 
instrumental attributes, rather than over-weighting a single, determinant attribute.  
However, if the determinant attribute is actually highly instrumental, the decision 
maker may arrive at a favorable outcome simply by applying a decision heuristic or a 
lexicographic decision rule:  “If [determinant attribute] is present at [level], buy.”  In the 
presence of a diagnostic determinant attribute, the careful consideration of desired 
benefits is unnecessary, as decision quality is entirely dependent on the determinant 
attribute—not on a broader array of attributes. If goal elicitation leads the decision maker 
to erroneously under-weight the instrumental determinant attribute, decision quality will 
suffer. Given the characteristics of instrumental and determinant attributes, I predict: 
 
H3:  When instrumentality is limited to a single determinant 
attribute, goal elicitation will lead to worse decision outcomes. 
 
 
Overview of Studies 
I present five experiments investigating consumption goal elicitation and decision 
making. Studies 1 and 2 examine my primary hypothesis that elicitation produces more 
positive decision outcomes, independently of expectations or effort. Studies 3a and 3b 
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explore the effects of limited or incomplete elicitation on attribute weighting and 
subjective outcomes. Finally, Study 4 tests additional predictions within my framework, 




Study 1:  Impact of Goal Elicitation on Satisfaction 
As an initial test of my framework, Study 1 investigated whether the elicitation of 
consumption goals can by itself lead more satisfying choices. Participants in the study 
chose among eight video clips based on summary descriptions, viewed their chosen clip, 
and reported measures of satisfaction. Prior to the choice, half the participants engaged in 
goal elicitation and half completed a filler task. In addition, measures of effort and 





One hundred thirty-four undergraduate business students at a large southeastern 
university participated in the study in exchange for class credit.  
 
Design and Procedure  
The entire study was administered by computer. Participants were informed that 
they would be selecting and viewing an instructional video about peeling boiled eggs 
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(this topic was selected because it is relevant to a broad audience, the videos would be 
unfamiliar, and their format and content vary widely). Next, they were randomly assigned 
to one of two groups: control or elicitation. To ensure that the timing of the study was 
similar for both groups, participants in the control group received a filler task in which 
they were asked to describe their activities on a typical day in a free-response, paragraph 
format. Participants in the elicitation group underwent a procedure involving three steps. 
In the first step, they were asked to reflect and write down the goals that they consider 
important for choosing an instructional video (see figure 3.1); space was provided for up 
to 20 goals. In the second step, they were presented with a ‘master list’ of potential 
consumption goals (figure 3.2). The master list was developed by the researchers through 
an iterative procedure, and included a wide variety of goals such as “…allows me to 
relate to the person giving the instructions” and “…helps me learn about peeling boiled 
eggs in general”. Participants were instructed to identify from the list any goals that they 
deemed personally relevant. In the third step, they were asked to specify the importance 
of their selected goals by allocating 100 total importance points among them. 
 






Figure 3.2:  Master List for Elicitation Task (Study 1) 
 
Next, all participants were shown paragraph descriptions of eight different video 
options, and asked to choose one video to view. Each description began by providing 
information about a common set of attributes (e.g., running length, picture quality, 
sound), then provided specific information about the content of the video (see figure 3.3). 
After participants had reviewed the options and made their decisions, their chosen video 
opened in a new window on the screen. After viewing the video, participants completed a 
questionnaire about their viewing experience which contained the measures described 
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below. Finally, participants were asked their opinions about the purpose of the study, 
thanked, and debriefed.  
 
 
Figure 3.3:  Sample Video Description (Study 1) 
 
Decision Outcomes  
Overall satisfaction was measured by a 100-pt. slider scale (0=”Very Dissatisfied, 
100=”Very Satisfied”). Attitude was measured with four items (negative vs. positive; bad 
vs. good; unappealing vs. appealing; ineffective vs. effective), also utilizing 100-pt. slider 
scales.  
 
Expectations and Effort  
Expectations were assessed after participants had read the descriptions of 
available options but not yet made their selections. Participants were asked how satisfied 
they expected to be with their chosen video, using a 100-pt. slider scale (0=”Very 
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Dissatisfied, 100=”Very Satisfied”). As a measure of decision effort, the software 
recorded the amount of time (in seconds) that participants spent deliberating among the 
video descriptions.  
 
Results 
 An examination of the suspicion check revealed that no participants guessed the 
purpose of the study. One participant entered strings of zeroes for the elicitation and 
dependent measures; removing this participant resulted in a sample size of 133. 
 Participants in the elicitation condition identified an average of 2.4 goals from the 
master list. The most popular goals selected were “doesn’t take up too much of my time” 
(selected by 43% of participants) and “is easy to understand the first time” (also 43%). 
The goals rated most important were “…makes me laugh” (M=40.17 among participants 
selecting this goal) and “…gives me external references where I can acquire more 
information” (M= 35.36). 
For the main analysis, I conducted two separate ANOVAs in which outcome 
satisfaction and attitudes toward the chosen video were compared across the control and 
elicitation groups. An initial check confirmed that the attitude items were highly 
correlated (α=.95), so they were averaged to form a composite attitude score. The pattern 




Figure 3.4:  Decision Outcomes (Study 1) 
 
 
Supporting my prediction, results of both ANOVAs yielded significant effects of 
goal elicitation. Overall satisfaction was higher among participants in the elicitation 
condition than those in the control condition (MElicitation=83.34, MControl=73.78; 
F(1,132)=4.88, p<.03). In addition, attitude towards the chosen video was significantly 
more positive for the elicitation condition (MElicitation=83.22, MControl=74.93, 
F(1,132)=4.55, p=. 04). These results confirm that participants benefitted from 
identifying their consumption goals in advance of the decision. 
Next, I examined the evidence for alternative accounts. In contrast to the 
argument that undergoing elicitation changed participants’ expectations regarding their 
choice outcome, ANOVA revealed no significant difference in expectations between 
elicitation and control conditions (MElicitation=75.48, MControl=73.28; F(1,132)=.56, 
p=.45). Similarly, in contrast to an account based on changes to the effort expended in 
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selecting a video, ANOVA revealed no significant difference in deliberation time 
between the two conditions (MElicitation=95.93, MControl=88.13; F(1,132)=0.738, p=.39). 
As an additional test, I conducted new, separate ANOVAs on both the satisfaction and 
attitude measures, in which I controlled for effort and expectations. In both cases, the 
effect of elicitation remained significant (satisfaction: F(1,129)=4.30, p=.04; attitude: 
F(1,129)=4.05, p=.05). These results suggest that the observed benefits of elicitation 
were not an indirect result of changes to effort or expectations. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 provide initial evidence that prior identification of 
consumption goals can improve subsequent decision outcomes. Contemplating and 
identifying benefits that were ultimately desired led participants to make choices that 
were more satisfying. Moreover, goal elicitation did not substantially alter participants’ 
expectations of satisfaction or the effort they devoted to the task. Together, these findings 
support H1. Study 2 uses a more objective measure to evaluate decision outcomes 
following goal elicitation. 
 
 
Study 2:  Effects of Elicitation on Objective Choice Outcomes  
In Study 1, I examined how formally identifying their consumption goals before 
making a decision improved participants’ subjective choice satisfaction. In Study 2, I use 





Seventy-six US residents participated via Mechanical Turk for payment. 
 
Design and Procedure   
Participants were told that the study involved decisions related to a backpacking 
tent (“the most familiar kind of tent…used in hiking, camping, and other outdoor 
recreation, as a means of shelter”). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions:  control or goal elicitation. In both conditions, participants were told to 
imagine that they were in the market for a backpacking tent. Participants in the goal 
elicitation condition were presented a screen like the one in figure 3.5, which asked them 
to list the benefits they seek when choosing a backpacking tent (“I would choose a 
backpacking tent that…”). Room was provide for as many as 20 benefits, and there were 
no time constraints. Participants in the control condition received no further instructions. 




Figure 3.5:  Goal Elicitation Screen (Study 2) 
 
 All participants then proceeded to the choice task. An introductory screen 
indicated that participants would be viewing an array of 54 different tents with different 
features (brand, fabric, weight, etc.), and that they should carefully evaluate the tents and 
choose the one they considered best. Next, participants in the goal elicitation condition 
were reminded of the benefits they listed in the previous step. Afterwards, all participants 
proceeded to the tent-selection screen (figure 3.6). The tents were adopted from stimuli 
created by Häubl & Trifts (2000). Each tent was described using eight features. Within 
each brand, there was a dominating option, with the optimum level for each feature. 
Participants could click on a hyperlink within the choice screen to view definitions of the 
different features (figure 3.7). Only one tent could be chosen, and there were no time 
constraints. Participants could view only one tent at a time—they first selected the brand 
from one drop-down box; next, they selected the model from a second drop-down box; 
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finally, the individual tent’s features were revealed when they clicked a third drop-down 
box. A notes area was provided, to allow participants to record potential brands and 
models in their consideration set. 
 
 





Figure 3.7:  Tent Feature Definitions (Study 2) 
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After making their choice, all participants completed two additional measures: 1) 
“If other tents were available, do you think you would choose a different one instead?” 
(Yes or No), and 2) “How confident were you in your choice of backpacking tent, at the 
time you made your choice?” (1=very unconfident…7=very confident). Finally, an open-
ended item asked them to describe how and why they made their choice. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 Analyses involved three primary dependent measures, adopted from Häubl & 
Trifts (2000). First, I measured whether a non-dominated tent was selected. Of the 54 
tents, six were superior or equivalent to the other 48 on all attributes; there was a single 
non-dominated tent for each brand. I also measured participants’ desire to switch to 
another alternative and their degree of confidence, as described above. Additionally, 




 Participants in the goal elicitation participants listed an average of 6.4 benefits; 
popular goals included “contains insulation for warmth,” “will last a long time with 
repeated usage,” “does not cost too much,” and “is easy to carry.”   
 In the main analysis, I compared the choice of non-dominated alternatives across 
conditions (figure 3.8). An overall chi-square test indicated significant differences in the 
choice shares by condition (χ2 (1,76) = 4.29, p<.04). Participants in the control condition 
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were significantly less likely to choose non-dominated tents than those who underwent 




Figure 3.8:  Choice Shares (Study 2) 
 
 Next, I analyzed switching behavior across conditions. An overall chi-square test 
revealed significant differences between intentions to switch (χ2 (1,76) = 5.07, p<.03). 
Participants in the control condition were significantly more likely to switch tents than 
those who underwent goal elicitation (MControl=32% vs. MGoals=10.5%).  
Analyses of choice confidence indicated no significant differences in confidence 
between control and goal elicitation ((MControl=4.74 vs. MGoals=5.13; F(1,74)=1.12, p>.2). 
Effort measures were also submitted to one-way ANOVA analyses. Results revealed no 
significant differences across conditions for choice time (MControl=224.56 vs. 
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 The results of Study 2 provide additional evidence that goal elicitation improves 
decision outcomes, in support of H1. Participants who identified their desired benefits 
before making a decision were more to choose a non-dominated alternative and were less 
likely to express switching intentions, indicating that elicitation produced higher 
objective decision quality and confidence. Furthermore, these results did not appear to be 
driven by extra effort during the decision task. Studies 3a and 3b explore a problem that 
might arise during the identification process—incomplete or limited elicitation—and the 
resulting effects on attribute weighting and satisfaction. 
 
 
Study 3a:  Decision Outcomes under Constrained Elicitation 
 
Studies 1 and 2 were intended to demonstrate the downstream benefits of 
consumption goal elicitation. In Study 3a, I compare the decision outcomes of individuals 
that have engaged in no prior elicitation to the outcomes of individuals who have engaged 
in either constrained or unconstrained elicitation. As in Studies 1-2, I expected that prior 
elicitation of desired consumption benefits would affect the weighting of decision 
attributes, leading to better outcomes. However, I expected the benefits of elicitation to 
attenuate when relevant goals were omitted from the process. Furthermore, comparing 
types of elicitation will elucidate whether it is the mere act of thinking of benefits (in 
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constrained elicitation) or a thorough consideration of goals (unconstrained elicitation) 




Two-hundred-one undergraduate students at a southeastern US university 
participated in the study in exchange for class credit.  
 
Design and Procedure  
The study incorporated a design similar to Study 1, with three main exceptions. 
First, the master list of potential goals was refined to include 15 items (see figure 3.9). 
Second, the extensiveness of the elicitation task was varied across two conditions 
(elicitation and constrained elicitation): participants in the elicitation condition were 
presented a complete ‘master list’ of all 15 potential consumption goals, while 
participants in the constrained elicitation condition were presented the same list with five 
goals omitted. Three different versions of the incomplete list were created—each version 
omitting five different goals—and participants in the constrained condition received one 
of these versions at random. Finally, the open-ended portion of the elicitation task was 





Figure 3.9:  Full Master List (Study 3a) 
 
The procedure was virtually identical to that of Study 1. After being told that they 
would be choosing between instructional videos, participants received the elicitation 
manipulation. Those in the elicitation and constrained elicitation conditions viewed a list 
of potential goals (described above), checked the goals they deemed relevant, and then 
rated their importance; the control condition completed the same filler task used in Study 
1. Next, all participants viewed descriptions of eight instructional videos, selected one 
video, and viewed their selection. Afterwards, they completed measures of satisfaction 
and attitude using 100-point slider scales. Finally, participants were asked about the 






Examination of the suspicion check revealed that no participants accurately 
guessed the purpose of the study. Five participants were excluded after reporting that they 
were unable to view their selected video, leaving a sample size of 196 participants. On 
average, the elicitation condition identified 6.42 goals from the master list, while the 
constrained condition identified 4.74 goals from the list (this is not surprising, given that 
five goals were omitted for the constrained group). The goals rated most important were 
“allows me to remember the technique easily when the need arises” and “helps me learn 
about boiling eggs in general.”  
An initial examination confirmed that the four attitude items were highly 
correlated (α=.97), so the items were averaged to form a composite attitude score. In the 
main analysis, I conducted two separate ANOVAs in which satisfaction and attitudes 
were compared across the control, elicitation, and constrained elicitation groups. The 
patterns of means for satisfaction and attitude are depicted in figure 3.10.  
For satisfaction, analysis via ANOVA revealed an overall main effect of condition 
(F(2,194)=3.15, p<.05), so planned follow-up contrasts were performed. Consistent with 
my framework and the findings of Study 1, satisfaction was significantly higher for 
participants in the elicitation condition than those in the control condition 
(MElicitation=79.53, MControl=67.74; t=2.35, p=.02). Additionally, and also consistent with 
my framework, satisfaction was significantly higher under elicitation than constrained 
elicitation (MConstrained=70.92; t=2.15, p=.04). The difference in satisfaction between 
control and constrained conditions was not significant (p>.4). For the attitude measure, a 
similar pattern of results was observed. Analysis via ANOVA revealed an overall effect 
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of condition (F(2,194)=3.32, p=.04). Follow-up comparisons revealed that, as predicted, 
attitudes were significantly more positive under elicitation than either control 
(MElicitation=79.68, MControl=68.44; t=2.47, p=.015) or constrained elicitation 
(MConstrained=72.02; t=2.08, p=.04). The difference between control and constrained 
conditions was not significant (p>.3).  
As in Study 1, I examined the evidence for alternative accounts based on changes 
to outcome expectations or decision effort. In contrast to these accounts, separate 
ANOVAs revealed no significant effect of condition on either expectations 
(F(2,194)=0.13, p>.8) or effort (F(2,194)=0.81, p>.4). As additional evidence, I 
conducted new, separate ANOVAs for satisfaction and attitudes, while controlling for 
effort and expectations. In both analyses, the effect of condition remained significant 
(satisfaction: F(2,192)=3.66, p<.03; attitude: F(2,192)=3.47, p=.03), and follow-up 









 Results of Study 3a extend the findings of the prior studies, providing further 
evidence that prior elicitation leads individuals to focus their decision process on the 
relative extent to which available options are likely to satisfy elicited goals. When the 
elicitation process is unconstrained, this focus improves the match between decision and 
consumption contexts, resulting in a more appropriate weighting of decision attributes 
and a more satisfying choice. However, in support of H2b, when elicitation is constrained 
by the omission of relevant goals, the match between decision and consumption contexts 
is inferior, resulting in a mis-weighting of attributes and a reduction in the benefits of 
elicitation. Additionally, Study 3a provided evidence that outcomes are improved by 
thorough elicitation and the true consideration of one’s goals—not simply motivating the 
decision maker to casually/incompletely think about what matters in general. Study 3b 
explores the proposed underlying process by directly manipulating the effects of goal 
elicitation on attribute weighting. 
 
Study 3b:  Goal Elicitation and Attribute Weighting  
 
In Study 3a, I demonstrated how decision outcomes are worse for constrained 
elicitation than for unconstrained/thorough elicitation. To clarify the attribute-weighting 
mechanism behind these outcome differences, Study 3b presented three groups of 
participants with a hypothetical decision between automobiles. Participants observed 
detailed attribute profiles for eight different automobiles and provided their preference 
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rankings. Prior to viewing the automobile profiles, two of the three groups completed a 
consumption goal elicitation task. The elicitation procedure was constrained for one of 
these two groups the omission of goals from consideration. In order to enable a 
directional prediction, I selected these omitted goals so that underweighting of relevant 
attributes would be expected (see below). For the analysis, I utilized conjoint analysis to 
derive the importance weight of each participant for each attribute, and then compared 




Two-hundred-six US residents participated on Mechanical Turk for payment.  
 
Design and Procedure   
The cover story asked participants to assume that they were interested in 
acquiring an automobile, and that they had already narrowed their consideration set to 
eight options. They were told that they would be viewing information about the eight 
options and indicating their preferences. 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of three conditions: control, 
elicitation, or constrained elicitation. In the control condition, participants were simply 
shown an introductory screen explaining the subsequent task. Participants in the 
elicitation condition were given the same introduction and then asked to identify their 
consumption goals from a master list of 18 possible goals (e.g., “I would choose an 
 77
automobile that keeps me and my passengers safe”). Figure 3.11 depicts the master lists 
used in the elicitation procedure. 
Participants in the new, constrained elicitation condition performed a similar task 
with one important exception: two goals were omitted from the master list. To decide 
which goals would be omitted, I first conducted a separate pretest in which 151 
participants were presented with a list of 12 automobile attributes and asked to rate the 
importance of each attribute. Based on this pretest, ‘trunk size’ and ‘paint color’ were 
selected as attributes that mattered to most participants but were moderate in importance. 
Next, I identified the two goals on the master list that mapped most directly to these 
attributes (“that can hold a lot of cargo (groceries, luggage, etc.)”; “that I will appreciate 
in terms of color, style, and appearance”), and I removed these two goals for the 
constrained condition. (Because high-importance goals are often activated without 
elicitation, and low-importance goals are unlikely to be activated even with cues from a 




Figure 3.11:  Master List for Selecting an Automobile (Study 3b)4 
 
All participants then proceeded to the ranking task, where they viewed attribute 
information about eight different automobiles, presented in a table format (see figure 
3.12). The table included six different attributes (legroom, safety, trunk, colors, age, and 
handling), chosen so that each mapped directly back to a goal on the master list (e.g., the 
“safety” attribute mapped directly back to the goal “that will keep me and my passengers 
safe”). Each attribute assumed one of two possible values (‘large’ or ‘small’ for trunk; 
‘newer’ or ‘older’ for age, etc.). The configuration of options was orthogonal across all 
six attributes, so that the eight automobiles comprised a comprehensive subset of possible 
attribute combinations (Wu & Hamada, 2011).  
 
                                                 
 
 
4 In the constrained elicitation conditions, the following two goals were omitted: “that can hold a lot of 




Figure 3.12:  Ranking Task (Study 3b) 
 
Participants were asked to arrange the eight automobiles in order of preference by 
using a drag-and-drop procedure, so that their highest-ranked option was placed at the 
top. No time limit was imposed. After completing the ranking task, participants 
responded to various background questions (including age, gender, driving experience, 
and automobile ownership). Finally, they were thanked and dismissed. 
 
Results 
On average, the elicitation condition checked 10.54 goals from the master list, and 
the constrained elicitation group checked 9.20 goals (this difference was not surprising, 
given that two goals were omitted from the latter condition). Prior to the analysis, data 
were screened according to three criteria determined in advance. Ten participants in the 
elicitation groups chose fewer than five goals from the master list. Ten participants spent 
an unrealistic amount of time on the ranking task (speed more than +2 SD, i.e. less than 
238 seconds). Finally, two options in the ranking task included a dominance relationship, 
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and seven participants were excluded for assigning a higher ranking to the dominated 
option. Screening resulted in a sample size of 179 participants. (All significant results 
reported below remain significant when the entire sample is included). 
In the main analysis, the relative importance weights of each participant were 
calculated for each of the six attributes, by use of conjoint analysis with ordinary least 
squares (e.g., Green and Srinivasan (1978)). The procedure involved two steps. First, the 
rankings assigned by a participant to each option were regressed on the levels of the six 
attributes represented by that option, yielding beta coefficients for each attribute level. 
Second, the difference between maximum and minimum beta coefficients was calculated 
for each attribute, yielding the importance for that attribute. 
To investigate my hypothesis, I focused on the two attributes mapping to goals 
omitted in the constrained elicitation condition (trunk size and paint color). Confirming 
the results of the pretest, these two attributes received only modest importance weights 
(M=7.35)—compared with ‘safety’ (M=37.78) for example, which received the greatest 
weight. The primary dependent measure, omitted_importance, was formed for each 
participant by summing the weights assigned these two attributes. Based on my argument 
that prior goal elicitation influences decision processing through the weighting of goal-
relevant attributes, less weight should be allocated to attributes associated with goals that 
were not active during the evaluation process. Thus, I expected omitted_importance to be 
lower in the constrained condition. 
In the main analysis, I conducted an ANOVA comparing omitted_importance 
across the three conditions. Results indicated a significant overall effect, (F(2,176)=3.50, 
p=.03), so planned follow-up comparisons were conducted. Comparisons revealed that 
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omitted_importance was significantly lower in the constrained condition than the 
elicitation condition (MConstrained =11.94, MElicitation=16.31; t=2.42, p=.02) or the control 
condition (MControl=15.82; t=2.15, p=.03). Importantly, elicitation did not artificially 
inflate the weights of the two focal goals, as omitted_importance for the elicitation and 
the “natural/instinctive” control conditions did not significantly differ (t=.273, p>.5). 
Stated differently, the weight assigned to the two focal attributes was lower when 
attribute-relevant goals were omitted from elicitation in advance of the decision. These 
results support my interpretation that prior elicitation of consumption goals led 
participants to weight decision attributes in light of those goals; therefore, when goals 




The results of Study 3b provide process-level evidence consistent with the 
framework developed earlier. Specifically, constrained elicitation of consumption goals 
led to systematic underweighting of attributes, as compared with complete/thorough 
elicitation and “natural” control conditions. These findings support both H2a and my 
general argument regarding the mechanism through which elicitation produces more 
satisfying decision outcomes, in which consumers are better prepared to trade off 
attribute information at the decision stage by focusing on the implications of those 
attributes for the benefits that they ultimately desire. In Study 4, I explore how product 
attributes may impede the weighting process following elicitation, nullifying or even 




Study 4:  Goal Elicitation Leads to Lower Satisfaction 
I theorize that the effectiveness of goal elicitation in improving decision outcomes 
depends on 1) the extensiveness of goals identified during elicitation and 2) the type of 
attributes present during the decision process. Studies 3a and 3b provided evidence for 
the first caveat by demonstrating how incomplete or constrained elicitation leads to 
reduced satisfaction and under-weighted attributes. Study 4 addresses the second 
stipulation by varying the presence of determinant and instrumental attributes. 
Participants in the study chose among four short stories based on a set of attributes, then 
read their chosen story, and reported their satisfaction. Prior to the choice, half the 
participants engaged in goal elicitation and half did not. Half the participants viewed 
story descriptions containing a single instrumental/determinant attribute and five non-
instrumental attributes; the other half viewed similar descriptions which included an 
additional instrumental attribute. I expected reduced satisfaction among participants who 










Short stories were deemed appropriate task stimuli for the study, because readers 
often disagree on what makes a “good” story, and because stories can be described via 
the presence or absence of determinant and instrumental attributes. Also, a story can be 
read in a relatively brief amount of time, allowing for consumption and satisfaction 
measures in a single study. Furthermore, short stories create a more robust choice 
environment to measure satisfaction, as instructional videos (in Study 1 and Study 3a) are 
somewhat novel and atypical. 
I sought one short story that participants were likely to enjoy, and three stories 
that were likely to be dissatisfying, so that the determinant attributes used to describe the 
stories would truly be instrumental in achieving outcomes. In pretests, the story 
“Before/After” (taken from EastoftheWeb.com) was rated highly by readers, while “The 
Sudden Walk” (from the Internet Speculative Fiction Database) was rated poorly. “On 
Pedagogy” (taken from the ACT standardized testing website) was officially designated 
as a poorly-written story, while “Food Chronicles” (from FanFiction.net) was included 
because of its poor grammar and deplorable plot. 
 
Design and Procedure  
The entire study was administered by computer. Participants were informed that 
they would be selecting and reading short stories. Next, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two groups: control or elicitation. Participants in the elicitation group 
underwent a procedure in which they were asked to consider and write down the goals 
that they consider important for choosing a short story (see figure 3.13); space was 
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provided for up to 20 goals. An example goal (“I can read in a relatively brief time 




Figure 3.13:  Goal Elicitation Task (Study 4) 
 
Next, all participants were shown descriptions of four different short stories 
(detailed in the Stimuli section, above) and asked to choose one story to read. A between-
subjects design was used for the attributes in the story descriptions. All participants saw 
story descriptions including an instrumental/determinant attribute (average rating—which 
actually indicated story quality and would be solely sufficient for choosing the best story) 
and five non-instrumental attributes (title, year published, language, and word count—
none of which was predictive of story quality). Half of the participants saw an additional 
instrumental attribute (summary), while the other half did not (see figure 3.14). After 
participants had reviewed the options and made their decisions, they were asked how 
satisfied they expected to be with their chosen story (0-100). The story appeared on the 
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subsequent screen. After reading it, participants indicated their overall satisfaction with 
the story (0=”Very Dissatisfied, 100=”Very Satisfied”). They were then asked how they 
selected their story, using an open-ended measure—which I planned to code based on the 
attributes mentioned. Finally, participants answered an instructional manipulation check 
question (similar to those used by Oppenheimer et al. (2009)), which required 
participants to read a paragraph in its entirety in order to correctly execute specific, 
counter-intuitive instructions.  
 
 




 Sixteen participants who failed the instructional manipulation check were 
removed from the sample, leaving 184 responses for the analyses. Participants in the 
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elicitation condition identified an average of 4.7 goals. The most commonly-listed goals 
related to story length and enjoyment. 
For the main analysis, I conducted a two-way ANOVA in which outcome 
satisfaction for the chosen story was compared across elicitation (control vs. goals) and 




Figure 3.15:  Overall Satisfaction (Study 4) 
 
Analyses via ANOVA revealed a marginal main effect of elicitation (MGoals=36.2, 
MControl=45.1; F(1,183)=3.27, p=.07) and no main effect of summary (MPresent=42.8, 
MAbsent=39.5; F(1,183)=.73, p>.3). As predicted, however, analyses revealed a significant 
elicitation*summary interaction (F(1,180)=4.21, p=.04). For participants given an 
additional instrumental variable, in the form of a summary, elicitation conditions did not 
reliably affect satisfaction (MGoals=43.5, MControl=42.3 F(1,180)=.03, p>.8). When 
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summary was absent, participants who identified their goals before the decision were 
significantly less satisfied (MGoals=29.4, MControl=48.1; F(1,180)=7.44, p<.01). 
 Analysis of the expectations measure revealed that consistent with prior studies, 
expectations did not differ significantly between elicitation conditions (MGoals=63.09, 
MControl=65.22; F(1,183)=.56, p>.5) or summary conditions (MPresent=66.14, 
MAbsent=62.4; F(1,183)=2.42, p>.12), nor was the elicitation*summary interaction 
significant (F(1,180)=1.98, p>.16). 
Reasons Analyses  
When no summary was provided, I expected participants who underwent goal 
elicitation to weight multiple attributes in their decisions, while control participants 
should focus primarily on the single instrumental/determinant attribute (average rating). I 
coded the open-ended ‘reasons’ question according to the attributes mentioned (1=yes, 
0=no, for each attribute). The elicitation*summary interaction was directional but not 
significant for the number of attributes mentioned (F(1,180)=2.4, p>.12); participants in 
the goal elicitation condition cited significantly more attributes than control participants 
when no summary was given (MGoals=1.52, MControl=1.22; F(1,180)=5.68, p<.02) but not 
when a summary was given (MGoals=1.49, MControl=1.46; F(1,180)<.04, p>.8). Also, an 
overall chi-square test revealed marginal differences in mentions of the average rating (χ2 
(1,184) = 2.85, p=.09). Participants in the control condition were directionally more 
likely to mention rating than those who underwent goal elicitation (MControl=45.6% vs. 
MGoals=33.3%). 
I also expected goal-elicitation participants to over-weight non-instrumental 
attributes in the decision, when no summary was given. An overall chi-square test 
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revealed significant differences in mentions of the title of the story (χ2 (1,184)=10.41, 
p<.01). Among subjects in the summary-absent condition, the goal-elicitation group cited 
the title of the story significantly more than the control group (MGoals=76.2% vs. 
MControl=42.9); on the other hand, subjects in summary-present condition cited title only 
around 13% of the time, and this effect did not differ across elicitation conditions 
(p>.21). Satisfaction was significantly lower among participants who mentioned title as a 
reason for choosing a story (MTitle=32.61, MNoTitle=45.86; F(1,182)=6.94, p<.01), 
confirming that this was a non-instrumental attribute. Mentions of other attributes did not 
differ significantly across elicitation or summary conditions. 
  
Discussion 
 Results of Study 4 provide evidence that goal elicitation may not always be 
advantageous for decision makers, but may in fact be harmful when the decision 
attributes provided are non-instrumental in achieving desirable outcomes. In the presence 
of a single instrumental/determinant attribute, participants who underwent goal elicitation 
were more likely to disregard or under-weight critical information (rating) and make a 
less-satisfactory choice. Satisfaction was no different among elicitation conditions when 








My research on consumption benefit elicitation supplements a variety of existing 
work on consumer goals, means-end linkages, and choice structuring. My basic premise 
was that explicit identification of benefits prior to a decision fundamentally changes 
subsequent decision making, by altering the importance assigned to specific decision 
attributes. In five studies, I demonstrated the effects of benefit elicitation on decision 
processing and ensuing outcomes. Studies 1 and 2 confirmed that elicitation leads to 
improved decision outcomes, and that these effects are not driven by changes to effort or 
expectations. Study 3a provided an important caveat contingent with my framework: 
when the elicitation process is constrained, its benefits for subsequent decision making 
can be attenuated. Study 3b supported my process framework by demonstrating that the 
weighting of attributes changes systematically when specific benefits are excluded from 
the elicitation process. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that the advantages of goal 




At a basic level, I have argued that benefit elicitation helps consumers to identify 
‘what will actually matter’ at the time of consumption. When consumers begin by 
explicitly stating the benefits that they seek from a product or service, their subsequent 
decision making will be directed towards these benefits, increasing the likelihood of 
choosing an option that provides them (greater satisfaction). This idea is consistent with 
the prescriptive implications of the context matching principle, in which decision makers 
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are advised to structure their decision environment to provide a context similar to that in 
which outcomes will be experienced (Payne, et al., 1999). In my setting, the simple act of 
benefit elicitation allows consumers to improve the match between decision and 
consumption contexts. As a result, they should be less subject to transient influences 
within the immediate decision environment, whether those influences come from internal 
factors (motivation, attention, mood, etc.) or from aspects of the choice itself 
(information format/order, complexity, choice set configuration, etc.). 
More broadly, I suggest that elicitation provides a means by which consumers 
may act as their own “choice architects,” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) structuring their 
decisions in a systematic manner that is conducive to positive outcomes. In principle, the 
elicitation process is simple, portable, and applicable to a vast array of decisions: 
consumers consider the benefits that they desire, weight attributes accordingly, and 
thereby make choices that are less susceptible to ‘irrelevant’ contextual cues. 
Furthermore, given that that elicitation is guided by consumers themselves, it is relatively 
immune to the criticisms of paternalism sometimes directed towards interventions based 
on the choice architecture framework (Hausman & Welch, 2010). However, as 
demonstrated in my studies, the benefits of elicitation depend on the consideration of a 
wide range of potential factors. To the extent that third parties such as salespeople and 
advertisers influence the benefits considered (constructively or destructively), they are 
still capable of impacting decisions. In the practical implications below, we provide 
examples by which third parties influence the elicitation process. 
By arguing that elicitation enables consumers to remain focused on their desired 
benefits during the decision process, my ideas overlap with prior work on the role of 
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decision mindsets. According to mindset theory (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999), decision 
makers tend to adopt a cognitive orientation to decide which benefits will lead to desired 
outcomes (deliberative mindset), followed by a functional orientation to decide how to 
achieve these benefits (implemental mindset). Applying this logic to my framework, I 
speculate that the process of benefit elicitation evokes a deliberative mindset, as 
consumers identify the benefits that specific benefits that they seek, and that it also 
facilitates the transition to an implemental mindset at the choice stage, as consumers 
evaluate the options in terms of their instrumentality for achieving the identified benefits. 
In contrast, I speculate that participants who have not identified their benefits in advance 
are more likely to oscillate between deliberative and implemental mindsets, 
simultaneously re-assessing the importance of attributes as they re-evaluate the options 
along those same attributes. ‘Switching mindsets’ is associated with a wide range of 
negative consequences (Hamilton et al. (2011), and if my speculation is correct, 
elicitation provides a means of addressing the problem. 
According to the classic ‘lens model’ and other probabilistic models of judgment 
and perception, individuals estimate the value of an unknown criterion by integrating 
cues in the environment which correlate with that criterion (Hammond & Stewart, 2001). 
Applied to consumer research (e.g., Holbrook (1981); Meyer (1981)), the ‘criterion’ often 
represents satisfaction that will result from product purchase, and ‘cues’ represent 
observable product attributes. Therefore, the task of the consumer is to integrate 
ambiguous attribute information to form an accurate estimate of their likely satisfaction 
from each option. The lens-type frameworks offer a compelling perspective on the value 
of benefit elicitation. With or without prior elicitation, consumers will often be inaccurate 
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in gauging the diagnostic value of individual attributes, and they will often fail to 
combine attribute information in a normative manner. However, elicitation facilitates the 
process in two distinct ways. First, elicitation helps consumers to identify and utilize 
valid cues (i.e., attributes that relate to eventual satisfaction). For example, Huffman and 
Houston (1993) demonstrated that when decision makers are assigned specific goals in 
advance, they are more likely to encode attribute information relevant (vs. irrelevant) to 
those goals. Second, as demonstrated across my studies, elicitation improves the ability 
of consumers to integrate cues in a consistent and systematic manner, based on their 
relative validity rather than transient aspects of the decision setting. Of course, as I 
demonstrate in my final study, there are circumstances in which elicitation may 




My findings suggest that satisfaction with a choice can increase substantially 
when consumers devote modest time and effort in advance of a decision to consider the 
benefits that they seek. Therefore, external parties who benefit from consumer 
satisfaction (retailers, brands, consumer advocates, etc.) would often be well advised to 
encourage and assist in the elicitation process. At the retail level, for example, there are 
numerous techniques that might be used to encourage shoppers to engage in elicitation 
prior to their purchase decisions. In offline settings, these triggers might take the form of 
appropriately worded signs, displays, or trained salespeople advising shoppers to consider 
the goals they have for making a purchase. In online settings, triggers could range from 
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simple messaging on product category pages to more interactive interventions (e.g., a 
pop-up window asking “What are the benefits you want from a [product]?”)  Importantly, 
prompts should encourage a focus on ultimate outcomes (“save money,” “peace of 
mind,” etc.) rather than product attributes (“low price,” or “great warranty,” etc.). 
However, these tools are only advisable when decision outcomes are not entirely 
dependent on a single, determinant attribute; in these cases, highlighting the key 
attribute—rather than providing a means of eliciting goals—is advisable. 
In some cases, consumers may be motivated to identify their desired benefits but 
lack the knowledge or expertise to do so comprehensively (Bond, et al., 2010). 
Assistance for these consumers may involve helping them to identify and choose among 
various potential benefits (much like the ‘master list’ in my studies). For many product 
categories, potential benefits can be derived from the criteria used by experts, reviewers, 
etc. to classify products in the category. For example, Consumer Reports considers 
“firmness” when evaluating mattresses; a related benefit might be stated as “I would 
choose a mattress that keeps my spine properly supported.” More sophisticated 
approaches are possible in environments where customer-specific data is available. For 
example, in a manner similar to recommendation agents, an online retailer might prompt 
consumers with a targeted set of potential benefits: “Here are some benefits that shoppers 
like you have been interested in...” I have shown that incomplete or constrained 
elicitation may fail to improve outcomes, so it is critical for consumers to be offered 
many opportunities to thoroughly identify their desired benefits. 
 Taking a different perspective, it is worth noting that benefit elicitation could play 
a valuable role in helping firms to differentiate their brands. A straightforward 
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implication may be stated as follows: “If there is a specific benefit that your product(s) 
will uniquely provide target consumers, then encourage the elicitation of that benefit 
early in the buying process.” As an example, the Greek yogurt brand FAGE brand applies 
parchment paper to the surface of its products – a unique attribute that satisfies benefits 
related to both taste and freshness. Through its advertising, packaging, etc. therefore, the 
brand might encourage the elicitation of benefits related to that attribute (“avoid wasted 
time and effort stirring,” “enjoy fresh yogurt whenever I feel like it,” etc.)  These benefits 
may not be obvious to the typical yogurt shopper (who focuses on flavor or nutritional 
profile), and thus may be omitted if no cues are provided. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
As an initial test of my framework, my studies contained a number of limitations. 
All of the studies involved hypothetical choices; moreover, all but one involved a novel 
choice of relatively minor importance (e.g., choosing a short video or short story). 
Although I expect the effects to be robust, future work should explore benefit in different 
decision environments. For example, all four studies involved a relatively modest number 
of attributes for each alternative in the choice set (e.g., six automobile features), and it is 
uncertain that the impact of elicitation would be similar if the number of attributes was 
substantially greater. Similarly, my studies utilized a setting in which distractions were 
minimized and participants were actively engaged in the choice. By the addition of time 
constraints, cognitive load, etc. to the task, future research might investigate the effect of 
such constraints on the number of benefits identified, the process by which attributes are 
evaluated and weighted, and subsequent decision outcomes. 
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Most of the outcome measures used in my studies were subjective (satisfaction 
and attitudes). Although these represent common measures of decision quality in 
preferential choice research, there exists no consensus on the most appropriate measure. 
With this in mind, alternative outcome measures (such as choice of non-dominated 
alternatives, which I actually measure in Study 2) should be considered and explored. For 
example, are choices made after elicitation more or less stable over time? In other words, 
given the same choice set on two separate occasions, are consumers more likely to 
choose the same option when they have engaged in elicitation? Additional measures 
might make use of more ‘objective’ standards. For example, do choices made after 
elicitation align more closely with the choices of experts, the recommendations of 
personalized agents, etc.? I predict that the benefits of elicitation would continue to exist 
across these alternative measures, but the question remains open. 
For many types of decision, specific goals are automatically activated by the 
decision itself, without formal elicitation (Carlson, Tanner, Meloy, & Russo, 2014; Shah 
& Kruglanski, 2002). For example, it is unlikely that automobile consumers would 
completely overlook the goal of safety (and attributes related to that goal), whether or not 
that benefit has been identified in advance. Importantly, my findings suggest that 
elicitation will influence the weight that non-obvious, moderately-important attributes 
receive relative to more-obvious ones. The specific direction of this influence is unclear 
and worthy of investigation. In contrast, when consumers have undertaken the exact same 
decision repeatedly, the decision can become “routinized” (Howard & Sheth, 1969) to the 
point that it occurs without minimal cognitive effort or elaboration. In such cases, I 
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expect the conscious consideration of benefits to have little impact. Future research could 
examine this possibility. 
A related question concerns the influence of benefit elicitation at varying levels of 
consumer expertise. On the one hand, experts may be especially capable of accurately 
identifying their desired benefits, so that the elicitation process would be particularly 
beneficial for this group. On the other hand, prior work demonstrates that at high levels 
of expertise, consumers become less likely to engage in effortful processing (e.g., 
information search (Johnson & Russo, 1984)). To the extent that effort is needed to 
interpret attribute information in terms of ultimate benefits, experts may be less likely to 
invest that effort, reducing the benefits of elicitation. Novices, on the other hand, may 
lack the consumption vocabulary to articulate their desired benefits, so elicitation may be 
a questionable solution for this group of consumers as well. These ideas offer intriguing 
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